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President Trump issued a proclamation in December 2017 purporting to
remove two million acres in southern Utah from national monument status,
radically shrinking the Grand-Staircase Escalante National Monument and
splitting the Bears Ears National Monument into two residual protected areas.
Whether the President has the power to revise or revoke existing monuments
under the Antiquities Act, which creates the national monument system, is a new
question of law for a 112-year-old statute that has been used by Presidents from
Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama to protect roughly fifteen million acres of
federal land and hundreds of millions of marine acres. If President Trump’s
shrinkages stand, they will be the largest removal of public lands from protected
status in U.S. history, and will put the remaining national monuments on the
chopping block.
This Article advances a novel theory showing that the President lacks the
power to revise or revoke monuments. The Antiquities Act gives a power only to
protect public lands, not to remove them from protection. Arguments developed
so far in litigation and scholarship fail to recognize a general feature of publiclands law: It consistently denies the President the power unilaterally to remove
lands from statutorily protected categories once they are placed within those
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categories. The Antiquities Act should be read to be consistent with this fieldwide pattern.
The Article explicates the reasons for this pattern. Generally speaking,
public-lands law has been very little theorized; but it needs a theory now. Publiclands law is a field defined by structured normative pluralism. It integrates a
range of deeply conflicting public-lands purposes, from mining and drilling to
wilderness preservation, across a range of statutes and agencies and acreage
totaling nearly a third of the land area of the United States. The asymmetric
premise against any presidential power to remove lands from protection is
rooted in this structure, specifically the President’s obligation to preserve for
Congress the option of protecting lands, and the dangers of hasty or corrupt
presidential action. The Article traces these rationales across the history of
statutory, executive, and judicial articulations of public-lands law and shows
that they apply to the present Antiquities Act dispute.
The Article also highlights the political and cultural dimensions of the
dispute: a series of three-way conflicts among “public-lands populists” who seek
increased use of and access to public lands (whose agenda the Trump
Administration has incorporated into its economic and ethno-national
populism), recreationists and environmentalists, and indigenous communities in
the Bears Ears region. Conflicts among these groups amount to fights over
collective identity—the nature of the “public” that public lands should serve.
This dimension of the conflict does not fall outside the doctrinal analysis of the
Antiquities Act. Rather, with a clear theoretical view of public-lands law, it is
possible to see that these agendas are already integral to the field itself. They
are central threads of its pluralism, and their competing claims fit within its
structure. An account of the larger field of cultural conflict both enriches the
theory of public-lands law and helps to show how the field should resolve the
present fight.
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INTRODUCTION
When Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke visited Bears Ears National
Monument in San Juan County, Utah, in May 2017, he was greeted by supporters
whose baseball caps urged, “Make San Juan County Great Again.”1 The
demonstrators meant that Secretary Zinke should advise President Trump to
revise or revoke the protected status of the 1.35 million acres of federal land that
President Obama had designated a national monument in 2016.2 In December,
President Trump issued a proclamation removing about 1.15 million acres (about
85 percent) of Bears Ears from monument status and separating the residual
monument into two tracts. On the same day, he issued a second proclamation
reducing the size of Utah’s Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument by
861,000 acres, leaving slightly over one million acres within the monument.3
1. See Julie Turkewitz, Battle over Bears Ears Heats up as Trump Rethinks its Monument Status,
N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/us/bears-ears-ryan-zinke.html.
2. See Coral Davenport, Obama Designates Two New National Monuments, Protecting 1.65
Million Acres, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/28/us/politics/obamanational-monument-bears-ears-utah-gold-butte.html.
3. See Presidential Proclamation Modifying the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument
(Proclamation
of
President
Trump),
82
Fed.
Reg.
235
(Dec.
4,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-modifying-grand-staircaseescalante-national-monument/.
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The two proclamations potentially opened substantial reserves of oil and gas,
uranium, and coal to mining and drilling.4 President Trump’s decision was a
victory for a network of public lands activists and local resource users who have
long criticized federal land management for usurping local control and
denounced national monuments, in particular, as abuses of presidential power.
Environmental groups, Native tribes, and the Patagonia corporation, among
others, filed suit in federal district court seeking to have the Trump proclamations
declared illegal as beyond the power Congress has delegated to the President to
govern federal public lands.5
The monuments proclamations present a question of judicial first
impression concerning the central language of the Antiquities Act of 1906. This
Act, which was adopted in response to the looting of Native American sites on
public lands, authorizes the President to create protected national monuments on
federal lands simply by issuing a proclamation doing so.6 The Act is silent on
how a national monument, once proclaimed, might be revised or revoked.7
The Administration has not yet fully articulated the legal theory of its
proclamations in litigation, but its position is adumbrated in the arguments of its
supporters.8 The heart of the pro-Administration argument is a structural premise
that the power to revise or revoke monuments is implied by Congress delegating
to the President the power “to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks,
historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific
interest . . . to be national monuments.”9 According to this argument, the power
to make law generally implies the power to revisit it, whether in withdrawing
regulations, repealing legislation, or declaring an end to hostilities.10 Besides this
general interpretive principle, the Administration’s interpretation of the Act also

4. See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Lisa Friedman, Oil Was Central to Shrink Bears Ears Monument,
Emails Show, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2018; Hiroki Tabuchi, Uranium Miners Pushed Hard for a Comeback.
They Got Their Wish, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2018 (on opening of potential uranium mining around Bears
Ears); Brian Maffly, Oil and Coal Drove Trump’s Call to Shrink Bears Ears and Grand Staircase,
According to Insider Emails Released by Court Order, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 2, 2018.
5. See, e.g., Thomas Burr, Bears Ears, Grand Staircase Lawsuits Will Stay in D.C., SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE,
Sept.
24,
2018
(on
suits
by
tribes
and
environmental
groups)
(https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2018/09/24/bears-ears-grand/); David Gelles, Patagonia v. Trump,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/05/business/patagonia-trump-bearsears.html (on Patagonia’s participation in Bears Ears suit).
6. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2012).
7. In this Article, I treat the kind of substantive revision that the Trump proclamations attempt as
presenting the same interpretive question as an outright revocation. The scope of revision power that the
Trump Administration claims in its Bears Ears proclamation—cutting over 80 percent of the monument’s
acreage and breaking it into two new monuments—suggests a power different only in form from the power
of revocation. I do not intend any sleight-of-hand by this elision.
8. See Todd Gaziano & John Yoo, Presidential Power to Revoke or Reduce National Monument
Designations, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 617, 618 (2018).
9. See 16 U.S.C. § 431.
10. See Gaziano & Yoo, supra note 8, at 639 (arguing for “a background principle of American
law” that “the power to execute a discretionary government power usually includes the power to revoke
it”).
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finds support in history. In the first fifty years of the Act’s existence, presidents
made substantial revisions in national monuments, shrinking a few by tens or
hundreds of thousands of acres and other (much smaller) ones by large fractions
of their total area.11 Surely, the argument goes, what the Act was long taken to
authorize is good evidence of what it authorizes today.
On the other side, the core of the plaintiffs’ case against the Trump
proclamations is a strict textual one: The Antiquities Act delegates the power that
it names—to “declare” monuments—and no more.12 Congress knew how to
grant a two-way power to withdraw or reserve lands reversibly and did so
explicitly in major public-lands statutes from the same period. The Forest Service
Organic Act of 1897 authorized the President to “revoke, modify, or suspend”
the national-forest status of public lands.13 The General Withdrawal Act of 1910
(Pickett Act) authorized the President to make temporary withdrawals of public
land, which, by the statute’s terms, remained in effect until revoked by the
President or by Congress.14
The argument of this Article is that the larger structure of public-lands law
supports the plaintiffs’ arguments by showing why it makes sense to treat
Congress’s delegation of power to the President in the Antiquities Act as
exclusively for proclaiming monuments, not for revising or revoking them.
Public-lands law has developed over decades a strong premise of an asymmetric
presidential power, a preference for presidential decisions that bring public land
within protected categories, and a corresponding wariness of presidential actions
that unilaterally make formerly protected lands available for drilling, mining, and
other privatizing regimes. This asymmetric premise reflects the structured
normative pluralism of the field—put more plainly, the way it integrates
competing purposes and management regimes from a centuries-long series of
statutes into a relatively coherent system of governance. Of course, a court need
not read the Antiquities Act in light of the broader body of law in which it fits.
Its language might perfectly well be read as a free-standing interpretive object. I
hope to show, however, that reading the Act as part of a relatively coherent
statutory scheme helps to make the best sense of it.15
11.
12.

See infra Part I.A.
See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Case 1:17cv-02591-TSC, Doc. 21-1 (Jan. 20, 2018) at 24–26 (advancing this plain-language argument); Mark
Squillace, Eric Biber, Nicholas Bryner & Sean Hecht, Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or
Diminish National Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 57–59 (2017) (so arguing).
13. Pub. L. No. 2 (1897). First delegated in the General Revision Act of 1891, the Presidential
power to establish national forests by proclamation had, by 1909, been used to designate more than 194
million acres as national forest. See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 580,
598 (1968).
14. 36 Stat. 847 (1910). The Pickett Act’s withdrawal power was repealed, along with most other
executive-branch powers of withdrawal and reservation, with the passage of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976.
15. Readers may recognize in this formulation an echo of the late Ronald Dworkin’s call to pursue
“integrity” in law and to interpret it to make it the best it can be. This interpretive approach is often
associated with the view that for any legal question there is a unique right answer, and with a morally
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Once lands are placed in specially protected categories such as monument
status, the very strong pattern across public-lands law is that only Congress, not
the President, may act to open them to extraction or, historically, other forms of
privatization of public resources.16 This pattern has developed for two chief
reasons: (1) a worry about precipitate executive privatization and the possibility
of inappropriate motives for such action, a worry sometimes described as
corruption; and (2) a recognition that extractive uses of land, once authorized,
may destroy the land’s unique value (scientific, historical, or scenic) and
effectively preempt Congress’s decision whether to preserve that value. The
protective purpose of the Antiquities Act does not itself show that the President
cannot strip protected status from national monuments, but it does fit monuments
within the field’s general reasons for the premise that the President may not
unilaterally open lands to extractive privatization.
The general account of public-lands law that this Article advances also
makes space for themes that are vividly present in the Trump proclamations, but
which the arguments now on public offer do not find ways to incorporate. As
noted earlier, it is widely recognized that the Trump proclamations open the Utah
monuments to mining and drilling, and media coverage assumes that this fact
bears on the appropriateness of the proclamations. Nonetheless, the
entanglement of the Administration’s monuments decisions with extractive
interests has not made its way into the legal analysis of the case. Yet it is worry
over precisely this sort of presidential permission for extraction that grounds the
asymmetric premise of presidential power over public lands. Critical focus on
this issue reflects an inchoate normative idea about public-lands governance that,
in fact, has footing in the field. Extractive interests occupy a major place within
the structure of public-lands law but, a place that is cabined by the premise
against presidential privatization.
The law of federal public lands governs nearly 30 percent of the country’s
acreage, including vast mineral and timber wealth and iconic scenic and

perfectionist view of the law as striving toward a particular substantive view of justice. See generally
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). The approach I take here treats public-lands law as a pluralist
rather than a perfectionist enterprise, whose integrity, if that is the word, consists in a specific structure
for the ongoing integration of perennially conflicting goals for and interests in the public lands. See
generally Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 169 (2012) (characterizing the plural goals of environmental law, including aspects of
public lands law).
16. Throughout this paper, I use privatization to refer to the creation of vested private claims on
public-lands resources, whether through the traditional means of transferring acreage (with or without
mineral or water rights) as real estate, or through today’s regimes authorizing mining, drilling, and
timbering. I sometimes refer to the latter as “extractive privatization,” and use “extractivism” to refer to
the political position that both advances extractive interests and links them to accounts of national interest
or collective identity. My reason for linking rather different regimes under the “privatization” rubric is
that they have presented the same core dangers in public-lands law all along, the risk that precipitate or
opportunistic executive-branch transfer of public resources will irreversibly compromise competing
values and pre-empt Congress’s ultimate authority in governing public lands. For this reason, they play a
unified structural role in public-lands law.
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recreational sites, and implicates divisive environmental questions from the
governance of mining to the protection of endangered species.17 Formed from a
palimpsest of statutes adopted between 1785 and 1976, it integrates competing
public purposes across deep conflicts over both the value of the natural world
and the makeup of “the public” itself.
In Part I, I outline the creation and putative revision of the Bears Ears and
Grand Staircase-Escalante national monuments. I argue that the Trump
proclamations do not support the Administration’s presentation of its revisions
as merely implementing the Antiquities Act’s requirement that monuments
occupy the smallest area compatible with protection of the designated objects.
Rather, the proclamations revisit and revise the substantive scope of the
monuments’ protective purposes, and arguably presuppose a narrowing of the
scope of values eligible for protection under the Act. The Trump proclamations
thus squarely raise the question of the President’s power to revise monuments
substantially. In Part II, I describe the Trump proclamation’s debt to public-lands
populism and outline the ideological field, network of activists and public
officials, and vision of “the public” that together generate this program for public
lands. In Part III, I turn to the question of how to interpret the Antiquities Act.
After surveying the arguments that have emerged in the current dispute, I propose
a framework for understanding public-lands law and locating the question of the
President’s proclamation power within it. The field displays a structured
normative pluralism, integrating competing public-lands goals in definite
patterns that enable their coexistence across uses ranging from mining to
wilderness preservation. Once public resources are subjected to vested private
claims—a reclassification that for economy’s sake I call privatization whether or
not it permanently converts federal land into private real estate—these claims
survive and are immune to later reclassification. When, however, land is
reclassified into a categorically protected status, such as a national park,
wilderness, or wilderness study area, only Congress may reopen it to new private
claims. Finding that the President can reclassify monuments to open them to new
private claims would make the Antiquities Act a departure from the way that
public-lands law otherwise integrates competing values through its statutory
allocation of powers. In Part IV, I set out a long-standing reason for this structure
of public-lands powers: preventing precipitate and potentially opportunistic
presidential opening of public resources to favored constituents—in a word,
corruption, which is especially troubling when its effect on protected lands would
be irreversible. I argue that this rationale applies to the Antiquities Act and helps
to explain the Act’s delegation of a one-way power to proclaim monuments, but
not to revoke or revise them. In Part V, I turn to the early presidential monument
revisions and show that they took place against a background of expansive claims
of presidential power to reclassify federal land—a power generally articulated
17. See generally GATES, supra note 13 (far-ranging account of the origin, scope, and structure of
the public lands and the legal regimes governing them).
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and exercised in ways that acknowledged the presumption against presidential
privatization, but which otherwise pushed executive control over public lands to
its limit and perhaps beyond. That claimed power accounts for the plausibility of
most of the early revisions in their times. They would not be plausible today as
exercises of the delegated power of the Antiquities Act.
I. THE ANTIQUITIES ACT AND THE TRUMP PROCLAMATIONS
The President’s power to create national monuments arises under the
Antiquities Act of 1906, which provides:
That the President of the United States is hereby authorized, in his discretion,
to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated
upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States
to be national monuments, and may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land,
the limits of which in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be
protected.18
National monuments comprise over fifteen million predominantly inland or
coastal acres (including the contested portions of Bears Ears and Grand
Staircase-Escalante), with most of the land area in the mountain West and
Alaska, as well as more than 750 million chiefly marine acres.19 Monuments
range from White Sands and portions of the Grand Canyon and the Marianas
Trench (including the deepest point in the world’s oceans) to the Pullman factory,
site of the iconic 1894 strike, and Stonewall, honoring the watershed “riot”
against antigay police harassment in Manhattan’s West Village.20 Many early
national monuments later became national parks, and most current monuments
are administered by the National Park Service, although some are entrusted to
the Forest Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration.21 Although Presidents enjoy considerable discretion in
prescribing the management of the monuments they designate, monument status
has typically entailed withdrawal from the various privatization schemes that
operate by default on public lands, making them eligible for conversion to private
real estate (before most such regimes were suspended in 1934, then repealed in
1976) or mining, drilling, and timbering.

18.
19.

16 U.S.C. § 431 (2012).
See Antiquities Act: 1905-2006, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/archeology/sites/
antiquities/monumentslist.htm (National Park Service inventory of national monuments in order of their
dates of creation and size, noting which agencies are responsible for their administration and which have
been converted to national parks or otherwise reclassified).
20. See id.
21. See id.
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A. Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante
President Obama’s 2016 Bears Ears proclamation withdrew the newly
designated monument from eligibility for timber sales, oil and gas leases, and
mining, along with other federal schemes for private extraction from the public
lands.22 The proclamation also directed the Forest Service and BLM to govern
the Monument in consultation with a pair of advisory committees, one drawn
from a set of “local stakeholders” including government officials, landowners,
recreational users of the region, business owners, and tribes, the other composed
entirely of members of local tribes: including members of the Hopi and Navajo
nations, two tribes of the Ute people, and the Zuni tribe.23 The monument
designation thus entailed both substantive changes in land use, particularly limits
on extraction, and procedural changes in governance of the region.
President Trump’s 2017 proclamation removing 1.15 million acres of Bears
Ears from monument status and separating the residual monument into two tracts
also restricted the formal input of the local tribal commission to one of the two
tracts, reopened the 1.15 million acres to various federal extraction regimes, and
made the residual monument subject to private grazing rights.24 As described in
the Introduction, Trump’s simultaneous proclamation reduced the size of Utah’s
Clinton-era Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument by 861,000 acres,
leaving slightly over a million acres in the monument.25 The proclamations arose
from a review that began in April 2017, when President Trump issued an
executive order directing Secretary Zinke to review major monument
designations made since 1996, with attention to their compatibility with the Act’s
scope (protecting “objects of historic or scientific interest” within “the smallest
area compatible” with their protection) and to “concerns of state, tribal, and local
governments . . . including [their] economic development and fiscal condition.”26
The memorandum that Secretary Zinke produced in response, after
criticizing the breadth of “landscape area designation” of protected objects in the
Clinton and Obama proclamations, charged these monument reservations with
economic harm to local communities that depend on “grazing, mining, and
timber production,” and other land uses that monument proclamations tend to
restrict.27 The memorandum emphasized that, “Local governments raised issues
22.
23.

See Proclamation No. 9558, 89 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1143 (Jan. 5, 2017).
See id. For a splendid treatment of the novelty and importance of this use of the Antiquities
Act, with both granular and thematic richness, see Sarah A. Krakoff, Public Lands, Conservation, and the
Possibility of Justice, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
24. See Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58081, 58085 (Dec. 8, 2017).
25. See Presidential Proclamation Modifying the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument,
supra note 3.
26. Presidential Executive Order on the Review of Designations Under the Antiquities Act
(Executive Order No. 13792, Apr. 26, 2017).
27. See Ryan K. Zinke, Final Report Summarizing Findings of the Review of Designations Under
the Antiquities Act (memorandum to President Trump), 6–7 (criticizing “landscape area designations”
and expressing concern with protecting extractive uses) available at https://www.eenews.net/assets/
2017/12/05/document_pm_01.pdf.

930

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 45:921

relating to lost jobs and revenue” arising from “the limitations placed on land
development . . . especially when there has been a lack of meaningful
consultation and public process before monuments are designated.”28 The
recommendations underlying the Trump proclamations thus directed attention to
a set of economic and procedural questions that form no part of the Antiquities
Act’s requirements or even its scope of concern, but which matter a great deal to
certain Western constituencies.
B. The Scope of the Trump Proclamations
The Trump Administration presents these proclamations as implementing
the Antiquities Act by enforcing its requirement that monuments include only
“the smallest area” compatible with the preservation of protected “objects of
historic or scientific interest.” If this were correct, the Trump proclamations
might not raise the question of whether the President can substantially revise or
revoke earlier monument designations. They might be justified on a narrower
power to adjust the implementation of earlier proclamations without revisiting
their substantive judgments. The issue of the President’s power to revise or
revoke monuments would still be interesting and important, but it would not be
squarely presented in the Trump proclamations.
The Trump Administration’s proclamations, however, sweep further than
that, excluding substantial categories of protected objects from the earlier
proclamations. Read in conjunction with Secretary Zinke’s underlying memo,
they even suggest a reinterpretation of the Antiquities Act itself to restrict its
scope of authorized protection to a narrow version of “objects of . . . scientific
interest,” excluding much of what monuments protect.29 Either way, the
proclamations are not a ministerial correction within the terms of the earlier
proclamations that established the monuments. They can stand only if the
President enjoys a full-dress power under the Act to revise or revoke earlier
monuments.
An “object of scientific interest” under the Antiquities Act may be a
landscape-scale phenomenon.30 After 1906, presidents immediately began to
treat the Act’s “smallest area” requirement as compatible with landscape-scale
monument proclamations, including President Theodore Roosevelt’s 1908
creation of the Grand Canyon National Monument (more than 800,000 acres)
and 1909 proclamation of Mount Olympus National Monument (over 600,000
acres).31 The Grand Canyon reservation was affirmed by the Supreme Court in

28. Id. at 8.
29. Id.; Proclamation No. 9558, 89 Fed. Reg. at 1143.
30. See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455–56 (1920); Tulare Cty. v. Bush, 306 F.3d
1138, 1142 (2002) (affirming broad scope of Presidential discretion, including eligibility of ecosystems
for protection).
31. Proclamation No. 794, 34 Stat. 225 (1908) (Grand Canyon); Proclamation No. 869, 35 Stat.
2247 (1909) (Mount Olympus).
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1920, and since then presidential discretion to designate landscape-scale areas as
national monuments has been consistently accepted against occasional legal
challenges.32 The Court rejected the argument that “there was no authority for
[the] creation” of the first Grand Canyon National Monument under the Act,
explaining that the canyon was eligible for monument status because, “[it] . . .
affords an unexampled field for geologic study [and] is regarded as one of the
great natural wonders.”33 So interpreted, the “smallest area” may be enormous,
so long as it corresponds to a qualifying “object of scientific interest.” A
monument’s permissible size is a function of the size of the object it protects.
The “smallest area” requirement implies no restriction of the statute’s protection
to small objects. This much is long settled.
The Trump proclamations raise the question of what scope of “scientific
interest” can anchor landscape-scale preservation. President Obama’s
proclamation creating the Bears Ears monument spends eight paragraphs
describing the area’s “diversity of . . .soils and microenvironments,” its many
plants (inter alia, low sage, winterfat, cliff rose, greasewood, common mallow,
low larkspur, needle and thread, the Kachina daisy, sand verbena, the straight
bladderpod, and Durango tumble mustard) and animals (ferruginous hawk,
flammulated owl, pallid bat, side-blotched lizard, bobcats, and “the occasional
mountain lion”), as well as the role of distinctive riparian and mesa settings in
assembling these ecological “communities.”34
The proclamations shrinking Bear Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante
argue that the original designations exceeded the Act’s “smallest area”
requirement by reserving more land than was necessary to protect the core
geological and archaeological features of the sites.35 President Trump’s Bears
Ears proclamation devotes all but two sentences of its discussion of qualifying
objects to archaeological and dramatic geological features of the monument, the
exception being a set of mesa plant communities that the proclamation identifies
as unique to the site.36 Much of the ecological basis of the Obama declaration
appears to fall by implication under the Trump proclamation’s complaint that,
“Some of the objects Proclamation 9558 identifies are not unique to the
monument, and some of the particular examples of these objects within the
monument are not of significant scientific or historic interest.”37 The Trump
proclamation continues, “Moreover, many of the objects Proclamation 9558

32. See Cameron, 252 U.S. at 465; Tulare Cty., 306 F.3d at 1140 (affirming broad scope of
Presidential discretion, including eligibility of ecosystems for protection).
33. Cameron, 252 U.S. at 456.
34. Proclamation No. 9558, 89 Fed. Reg. at 1141–43.
35. See id. at 1143.
36. Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. at 58084 (“The Indian Creek area [one of the two remnant
monuments left by the Trump proclamation] also includes 2 prominent mesas . . . which are home to relict
plant communities . . . that exist only on these isolated islands in the desert sea and are, generally, unaltered
by humans.”).
37. Id. at 58081.
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identifies were not under threat of damage or destruction before designation such
that they required a reservation of land to protect them.”38 (There is no statutory
requirement that Antiquities Act proclamations identify objects that are “under
threat of damage or destruction.”).39 The Administration’s view of the Act
appears to be that qualifying objects do not include ecosystems, plant
communities, etc., except where these are unique to the place or hold
extraordinary scientific interest for some other reason.
President Clinton’s proclamation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante
monument devoted one of five paragraphs (and about a third of its total words)
to describing among its qualifying objects the area’s varied “life zones” of soils,
flora, and fauna.40 President Trump’s proclamation shrinking the monument in
pursuit of the “smallest area” requirement makes no reference to ecology or
biodiversity, instead devoting its discussion of qualifying objects (fourteen
paragraphs, though not much longer in sum than the Clinton proclamation) to
geological, paleontological, archaeological, and historical features of the area.41
The Trump proclamation does note the prior proclamation’s attention to “animal
and plant species” and observes that the “revised boundaries contain the majority
of the habitat types originally protected,” but gives no indication that it regards
this partial continued protection as legally obligatory, and indeed appears to
claim that these are, by and large, not qualifying objects, being neither unique
nor “under threat or damage or destruction.”42
The Trump Administration’s new monument boundaries, especially in
Bears Ears, do not plausibly delimit the “smallest area” necessary to protect the
objects that President Obama designated as of scientific or historic interest. They
delimit an area fitted to a new set of protected objects, smaller than and
qualitatively different from Obama’s. President Trump’s monument reductions
are not adjustments of the monuments’ sizes to the “smallest area” that preserves
their protected objects but rather a substantive revisiting of which objects within
the monuments are eligible for protection. They can be justified only by the
power to revise or revoke earlier monument proclamations. They therefore
squarely present the question whether that power exists under the Antiquities
Act.
I next turn in Part II to the political context and ideological drivers of the
Trump proclamations before engaging, in Part III and thereafter, the question of
how best to interpret the Antiquities Act.

38.
39.
40.

Id.
See 16 U.S.C. § 431.
See Presidential Proclamation Modifying the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument,
supra note 3.
41. See id.
42. Id.
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II. THE TRUMP PROCLAMATIONS AND PUBLIC-LANDS POPULISM
The Trump executive order opening the process of revisiting the
monuments, and the Zinke memorandum prepared in response, emphasize the
effects of monuments on local economies and the level of local feedback and
support for monument designations. The Zinke memorandum takes a
particularly sharp tone of advocacy. Zinke observes that, although the monument
designations under review were sometimes preceded by public meetings, “these
meetings were not always adequately noticed [sic] to all stakeholders and instead
were filled with advocates organized by non-governmental organizations to
promote monument designations.43 (It is worth noting that this dynamic is
similarly reflected in the public comment process for this review . . . ).” 44 The
memorandum seeks to rebut the views of monument supporters, asserting that
their view that “monument designation [can] prevent the sale or transfer of public
land . . . is false and has no basis in fact,” while faithfully transmitting the views
of monument opponents, “often local residents,” whose concerns were
unfortunately swamped by “a well-orchestrated national campaign organized by
multiple organizations.”45 The Trump Administration documents, then, take the
side of a local and regional constituency that favors increased extractive access
to the public lands. The next subpart sketches that constituency and its relation
to the Trump Administration.
A. Public-Lands Populism and Extractivist Nationalism
While issuing his proclamations in Salt Lake City, Utah, President Trump
delivered a brief address on control of federal public lands. He denounced
“abuses of the Antiquities Act [that] give enormous power to faraway
bureaucrats at the expense of the people who actually live here, work here, and
make this place their home . . . where they raise their children . . . the place they
love.”46 The Obama and Clinton monuments, he said, had brought “harmful and
unnecessary restrictions on hunting, ranching, and responsible economic
development,” preventing ranching families from “passing on their businesses
and beloved heritage to the children.”47 President Trump continued, “These
abuses of the Antiquities Act have not just threatened your local economies;
they’ve threatened your very way of life. They’ve threatened your hearts.”48
Future land management, he promised, would “give back your voice,” prioritize

43.
44.
45.
46.

Zinke, supra note 27, at 8.
Id.
Id. at 2–3.
See President Donald Trump, Remarks on Signing Proclamations Affecting Prior Designations
Under the American Antiquities Act of 1906 in Salt Lake City, Utah, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 3
(Dec. 4, 2017)
47. Id.
48. Id.
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“the local communities that knows [sic] the land the best and that cherishes the
land the most,” and make public land open to “public use.”49
President Trump’s remarks highlight a key aspect of his monument
proclamations: the embrace and elevation of a long-running strand of Western
politics. This politics, which I will call public-lands populism, contests the
question of whose lands the federal public lands should be—that is, whether they
should be federally administered, transferred to state and local control, or
privatized. Like all populism, this variety also contests the question of just who
count as part of “the public.”50 Its answers have consistently favored state and
local control; extractive policies such as mining, drilling, and timbering; and
political, material, and symbolic primacy for local landholders and employees in
the extractive industries. This set of views has circulated for decades in rural and
activist networks and finds more formal development in intermittent litigation by
local governments and property-rights organizations such as the Pacific Legal
Foundation.51
B. Public-Lands Populism: What and Who It Is
Public-lands populism combines its substantive priorities for use of federal
lands with a dissenting constitutional account of authority over those lands.
These themes link populist agitation across decades and topical flashpoints as
well as counties and states, providing a flexible but unifying set of tropes for
antifederal and antiregulatory politics.52
1. The Ideological Orientation of Public-Lands Populism
Public-lands populism’s adherents frequently voice a constitutional and
historical narrative about Western public lands: Congress ought to have
49.
50.

Id.
In my discussion of President Trump’s nationalism, I am influenced by Jan-Werner Muller’s
formulation of “populism,” which escapes various fuzzy tropes (anti-elitism, etc.) to hone in on a form of
political appeal that identifies the normative character of the nation, the “true” nation, with a subset of the
actual population, thus making possible various antidemocratic, majority-trumping or illiberal, minoritysubordinating moves on behalf of the “true” people. See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM?
(2016). A characterization of how one qualifies as a member of that elect is thus essential; public-lands
populism trades on such an account, emphasizing the local, rural, hardworking/extractive, and implicitly
or explicitly Anglo character of its actual and ideal constituencies.
51. Jeffrey W. McCoy, PLF Urges the Administration to Reverse Antiquities Act Abuses, PACIFIC
LEGAL FOUNDATION (May 26, 2017), https://pacificlegal.org/plf-urges-administration-reverseantiquities-act-abuses/.
52. In this description, I mean to emphasize that I am not describing merely a “protest” movement,
and, indeed, that such an image implies a false picture. Protest of the kind I am describing here advances
an alternative account of legality, and in that sense is jurisgenerative. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B.
Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006) (describing the role
of social movements in opening up settled points of interpretation in legal culture and bringing new, or
old, commitments to previously settled debates); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) (exploring the “jurisgenerativity” of nonlegal actors, such as messianic religious communities and radicals of various stripes).
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privatized these lands or turned them over to the states, as it did with Eastern and
Midwestern acreage.53 Its failure to do so is not just dereliction but usurpation:
the Constitution’s Property Clause grants only the administrative powers
necessary to Congressional disposal of federal lands to states or individuals, not
their permanent retention and management.54 Permanent federal land requires
the consent of the state in which the land is set and federal purchase of that land.55
All federal public land, then—nearly 70 percent of Utah, for instance—
represents an illegal form of domestic colonialism, in which lands and resources
that should be controlled by state governments and local residents are instead
ruled from Washington, D.C., subjecting local resource users to unaccountable
bureaucratic oversight and relative poverty in a rich terrain.56 These arguments
for the constitutional illegitimacy and historical injustice of federal reservations
are aligned with accounts of the political and scientific illegitimacy of resource
preservation. Denial of anthropogenic climate change is a recurrent theme in
these networks, as is the view that wild-lands preservation and nonmotorized
outdoor recreation are the pet agendas of small but wealthy coastal elites, which
capture the political process to engineer “land-grabs” such as the controversial
monument proclamations.57 While none of this constitution-in-exile theory
appears in the official documents of the Trump Administration, it may exercise
a gravitational tug, helping to account for denunciations of landscape-scale
protection and of federal management of natural resources that some local
interests would prefer to use differently. The more concrete commitments of
public-lands populism, as we have seen, are front-and-center in the substance
and rhetoric of the Administration’s monuments proclamations.

53. See, e.g., Michael S. Coffman, Powerful Forces: More than a Century of Eastern Control of
the West’s Natural Resources, RANGE MAGAZINE, Fall 2016, at 16–19 (“The U.S. cannot ‘own’ this land
constitutionally, even though it claims it does. Upon entering the United States the new western states
should have been given land not claimed by the settlers.”).
54. See, e.g., Michael S. Coffman, Original Intent, RANGE MAGAZINE, Summer 2016, at 14–17 (so
arguing).
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., Coffman, Powerful Forces, supra note 53, at 19 (“An incredible war between the
federal government and western ranchers has been going on since 1891, mostly under the radar, pushed
and funded by powerful northeastern progressive financiers and industrialists . . . It has led to a very
corrupt legal system that tragically has no fidelity to the restrictions imposed by the U.S. Constitution.”).
57. Michael S. Coffman, Hope! Need Reform Could Be Coming to the EPA Swamp, RANGE
MAGAZINE, Summer 2017, at 10–12 (describing EPA as “probably the most corrupt agency in the federal
government” and asserting that, although “[v]ery few urbanites understand the depth of its corruption and
list for more and more power that’s at the heart of the EPA . . . President Trump does”); Michael S.
Coffman, Climate Racketeering, RANGE MAGAZINE, Winter 2017, at 15–16 (“hard empirical evidence
strongly suggests that man’s use of fossil fuel has little to do with global warming”); Dave Skinner,
Unforgettable, RANGE MAGAZINE, Spring 2017, at 18–19 (welcoming Trump’s election by recalling the
Clinton Administration’s “post-Grand Staircase orgy of national monuments designations”).
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2. The Networks of Public-Lands Populism
This ideology connects lawmakers with lawbreakers in a circuit of dissent
and affirmation. For instance, Ammon Bundy, the leader of the notorious 2016
occupation of the Malheur Wildlife Refuge in southeastern Oregon, recently
joined elected San Juan County officials in a favored form of protest: riding allterrain vehicles into areas of federal land that land-management agencies have
closed to motorized traffic.58 The state legislatures of both Utah and Nevada have
passed resolutions endorsing the constitutional theories and land-management
agendas of the movement, and Utah’s now-retiring Senator Orrin Hatch has long
been regarded as a protector at the federal level.59 It was San Juan County
Commissioner Calvin Black, not a militia member, who announced at a BLM
hearing in 1979:
We had enough of you guys telling us what to do. I’m not a violent man, but
I’m getting to the point where I’ll blow up bridges, ruins, and vehicles. We’re
going to start a revolution. We’re going to get back our lands. We’re going
to sabotage your vehicles. You had better start going out in twos and threes
because we’re going to take care of you BLMers.60
Black’s threats came amid the 1970s blooming of this ideology that is often
called the Sagebrush Rebellion, which counted among its allies presidential
candidate Ronald Reagan and his first-term Secretary of the Interior, James
Watt.61 The Sagebrush Rebellion was the incubator for later resistance to
monument proclamations and was itself a recasting of a long-standing set of
antiregulatory themes that run back to the very beginning of federal withdrawals
of public land.62
Public-lands populism has been a jurisgenerative movement; that is, it has
propagated a vision of public-lands law, from the statutory to the constitutional

58. See Jonathan Thompson, A Reluctant Rebellion in the Utah Desert, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
May 13, 2014 (detailing Bundy involvement in motorized trespass protest and arrest of County
Commissioner).
59. See Raymond Wheeler, War on the Colorado Plateau, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 12, 1988,
at 17–18 (describing Utah Senator Orrin Hatch’s patronage of the so-called Sagebrush Rebellion and seesawing of BLM land-use agendas between Carter and Reagan Administrations).
60. See id. (reporting the April 12, 1979 statement of San Juan County Commissioner Calvin
Black).
61. See R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LANDS, WESTERN ANGER: THE SAGEBRUSH
REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 71–91 (1993) (tracing the origins and effects of the
Sagebrush Rebellion of the mid-1970s and 1980s).
62. See, e.g., 7 Cong. Rec. 1719–23, 1861–69 (1878) (Congressional attacks on Interior Secretary
Carl Schurz’s early efforts to limit private commercial timbering on federal land); id. at 1722 (Statement
of Senator Blaine) (“I know of nothing in the world to parallel it except that great assertion in our immortal
Declaration of Independence that the King of England ‘has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent
hither swarms of officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance.’”); id. (Statement of Senator
Teller) (“I claim that nothing is demanded by the people in the Territories now that has not been conceded
to all settlers in the [previous] new Territories.”); id. at 1721 (Statement of Senator Blaine) (“[T]he hardy
pioneer who goes forth and bears the flag of civilization onward. . . shall have the air and the water and
the wood . . .”).
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level, that expands the possible meaning of this body of law and connects it with
the lived experience of certain communities in the American West.63 But the
question for adjudication is always how far conflicting visions of the law can
coexist or be integrated, and which ones must give way.64 To address this
question, we now turn to the interplay between the Antiquities Act and the
structure of public-lands law.
III. INTERPRETING THE ANTIQUITIES ACT ON THE TERRAIN OF PUBLIC-LANDS
LAW
On their face, all the major arguments now in play for and against the Trump
proclamations have some plausibility. The text of the Antiquities Act can support
the view that it withholds the power of monument revision or revocation from
the President, and also the view that it implicitly grants that power. The early
decades of presidential practice under the Act seem to support a power of
revision, but that practice was never tested in court and stands in some tension
with a 1938 Attorney General opinion denying any presidential power to revoke
monuments.65 The purpose of the Antiquities Act is to preserve public lands, but
that purpose, without more, does not say whether a later President may reverse
an earlier President’s preservationist proclamation. Traction comes from setting
the question of the Trump proclamations’ legality within the larger landscape of
public-lands law. In this Part, I first briefly rehearse the arguments for the Trump
Administration’s monument proclamations, then turn to developing an account
of public-lands law as the interpretive frame for the question.
A. Text versus History: For and Against the Trump Proclamations
The straightforward case that the President may not revoke or substantially
revise earlier monument proclamations rests on the text of the Act itself. The
Antiquities Act authorizes the President to “declare” national monuments but
makes no mention of revising or revoking earlier monument proclamations.66
The first premise of textual interpretation is that a statute should be read to say
only what it says, and no more.67 On this account, the Antiquities Act confers
only the power it names: a one-way power to withdraw and reserve public lands,
but no power to reverse those actions.
Textualist interpretation seeks to enforce rule-of-law values of
predictability and accountability by inhibiting (“preventing” seems optimistic)
judges and other interpreters from reading into statutes the policies that they
63.
64.
65.

See generally Cover, supra note 52 (developing the theory of jurisgenerativity).
See id. (so arguing).
See Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney National Monument, 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 185, 188

(1938).
66. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2012).
67. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW 3 (2016) (summarizing textualism as the
idea “that the alpha and omega of statutory interpretation in the enacted text of the statute”).
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prefer.68 This posture invites use of certain interpretive canons, signally
expressio unius, the presumption that a statute’s stating one thing implies its
exclusion of things not stated.69 The textual argument against the Trump
proclamations is that the Antiquities Act does not do what it does not say.
But what does it say? What meaning is fairly attributable to a statute that
confers a power without reference to its potential obverse? The expressio unius
canon has not produced any authoritative rule of statutory construction to the
effect that a grant of power is one-way unless a power of reversal is explicit.
Examples to the contrary are ordinary enough that Yoo and Gaziano propose the
opposite: a “background principle. . .that the authority to execute a discretionary
government power usually includes the power to revoke it—unless the original
grant expressly limits the power of revocation.”70 Their examples, however,
mainly concern constitutional powers—Congress’s power to repeal a statute, the
President’s power to remove a discretionary appointee—as well as the power of
agencies to withdraw previously issued regulations.71 It is commonsensical to
suggest, as they do, that government could not go on if today’s officials were
generally bound by the actions of their predecessors (or their own earlier acts),
either as a bare functional matter or as a matter of legitimacy as new public
attitudes and elections put new tasks on the agenda of government and remove
others. They give no reason to think, however, that these considerations should
produce a uniform rule of interpretation for all congressional grants of power to
the President, nor have courts ruled that it does.
Textualism generally takes support from both predictability and democratic
legitimacy inasmuch as its advocates can say in good faith that Congress knew
how to grant the President a power to revoke or revise monuments and didn’t do
so. In this case, that claim has some historical weight. The Antiquities Act’s
silence on the reversal of monument proclamations is in contrast to two major
contemporaneous public-lands statutes. The Forest Service Organic Act of 1897
authorized the President to create national forests on federal lands and also to
“reduce the area. . .or . . .vacate altogether any order creating such reserve.”72
Representative John Lacey, who would become the sponsor and architect of the
Antiquities Act, argued in floor debate that the Organic Act’s revocation power
was necessary because it revised an 1891 act that gave the President “power to
create a reserve, but no power to restrict or annul it, and there ought to be such

68. See id. (role of textualism in maintaining “rule of law values” such as constraining “judicial
discretion” and making “statutory interpretation more predictable”).
69. See id. at 78–81 (discussing this canon and its relation to textualist values).
70. Gaziano & Yoo, supra note 8, at 639.
71. See id. at 640–47 (providing constitutional examples of the implied relation between a power
to do and a corresponding power to undo a legal act).
72. See 30 Stat. 11, 36 (1897).
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authority vested in the President.”73 Similarly, the General Withdrawal Act of
1910, passed in response to a request from President Taft to clarify his power in
this respect, authorized the President to withdraw federal land temporarily from
privatization for public purposes, and stated that such a withdrawal would remain
in effect until either the President or Congress revoked it.74
Apart from the argument that grants of power should be presumed to include
the powers of revocation and revision, the case for the legality of the Trump
Administration’s proclamations rests mainly on the history of presidential
practice in the decades after the Antiquities Act was enacted. Orders shrinking
monuments went unchallenged in the early and middle decades of the twentieth
century. Most dramatically, President Wilson in 1915 cut 313,280 acres from
President Roosevelt’s 639,200-acre Mount Olympus monument.75 President
Truman cut 4700 acres from Santa Rosa Island National Monument, which had
been established at just over twice that size by President Franklin Roosevelt, and
President Eisenhower cut 8920 acres from the Great Sand Dune National
Monument.76 Smaller monument revisions were often measures to accommodate
conflicting private claims under then-extant homesteading laws, and no
substantial presidential reduction took place between 1956 and 2017.77
I’ll return in Part V to these early presidential revisions. First, however, I
will detail the setting of public-lands law in which, I argue, all these arguments
belong.
B. Locating the Antiquities Act Question Within Public-Lands Law
Public-lands law displays a structured normative pluralism. It integrates a
range of competing values: privatization and extraction; motorized recreation
and hunting; scenic preservation, hiking, and solitude; and ecological
preservation and biodiversity. Public-lands law is substantially structured by
centuries of statutes, adopted between 1785 and 1976, and the key to
understanding a hard question today lies in the way the various statutes have
integrated these goals into a single regime.

73. Representative Lacey (IA), “Sundry Civil Appropriations Bill.” Congressional Record 29:
2677 (Mar. 2, 1897), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1897-pt3v29/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1897-pt3-v29.pdf.
74. Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1976).
75. Proclamation No. 1293, 39 Stat. 1726 (1915) (transferring portions of Mount Olympus National
Monument to management as national forest).
76. Proclamation No. 2659, 10 Fed. Reg. 10275 (Aug. 22, 1945) (finding that the lands removed
from the monument were “now needed by the War Department for military purposes” and that their
elimination from the monument “would not seriously interfere with its administration”); Proclamation No.
3138, 21 Fed. Reg. 4035 (June 13, 1956) (finding that “retention of certain lands within the monument is
no longer necessary” for “the preservation of the great sand dunes and additional features of scenic,
scientific, and educational interest”).
77. See infra notes 157–165 and accompanying text (discussing history and variety of previous
monument revisions).
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1. Public-Lands Law’s Eras, Constituencies, and Ideologies
Public-lands law has developed through a series of distinct eras, each of
which generated distinctive statutory regimes. Many of these regimes persist
today in a kind of statutory palimpsest. Between 1785 and the last three decades
of the nineteenth century, the overriding agenda of the field was privatization in
service of economic (and political) development.78 Statutes made public lands
available for sale, as grants to railroad companies, and to individual settlers in
return for homesteading, timbering, timber-planting, mining, draining wetlands,
irrigating drylands, and, generally, domesticating the terrain and extracting
commodities from it.79 President Franklin Roosevelt closed most public lands to
homesteading in 1934 and 1935, and in 1976, Congress, in the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), repealed the remaining homesteading
statutes and other regimes for disbursing federal acreage as real estate.80
Nonetheless, extensive mining, drilling, and timbering continue on the multi-use
public lands.81 Grazing rights and certain motorized access routes also persist as
legal survivals from the period of development-oriented public-lands law.82
Beginning in 1872 with the congressional creation of Yosemite National
Park, a second mode of public-lands law entered the field: permanent reservation
of land under federal management to serve one or another version of public
interest.83 (Previous development statutes had provided for federal retention of
land for post offices and military sites, but these were ancillary to developmentoriented privatization, not alternatives to it.)84 The first statute authorizing such
reservation apart from special acts of Congress was the 1891 provision
delegating to the President the power to reserve timberlands, later replaced by
the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897.85

78. See generally GATES, supra note 13 (describing the rich history of the political processes and
interests at play in the disbursement of the U.S. public domain); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-1915, 13–61,
571–91 (1st ed., 1964) (setting out in detail the extraction of wealth from public lands that powered
nineteenth-century economic development).
79. See, e.g., General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2012) (“[A]ll valuable mineral deposits
in lands belonging to the United States . . . shall be free and open to exploration and purchase, and the
lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States . . .”).
80. See Gates, supra note 13 at 612–13 (narrating withdrawal of public lands from settlement under
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (restricting withdrawals of lands to the
procedures set forth in FLPMA).
81. See Exec. No. Order 6910 (Nov. 26, 1934) (withdrawing lands from settlement in the Western
states).
82. See Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. § 315 et seq. (governing grazing on public lands);
S. Utah Wilderness All. v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 746–47 (10th Cir. 2005) (claims of public access arising
under pre-FLPMA Revised Statute 2477 to be adjudicated by courts on common law basis, rather than
initially decided by the BLM and reviewed under administrative law standards).
83. See An Act to Establish a National Park Service, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (repealed 2014).
84. See Rock Island Military Reservation, 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 359 (1862) (referring to such
measures).
85. See 30 Stat. at 32–35 (1897).
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These permanent reservation statutes pursued two distinct families of
purposes. Conservation statutes promoted utilitarian management of resources
that were thought to be vulnerable to wasteful private extraction. Preservation
statutes removed land from the pressures of economic use in certain unique and
irreplaceable locations. As the next subpart describes, these two sets of goals
became central to the shape of public-lands law because they were embodied in
two distinct classes of statutes: multiple-use statutes that gave administrative
agencies considerable discretion in setting and revising priorities and permissible
uses for the acreage they governed, and categorical statutes that set aside land
for specific purposes—in practice almost always preservation purposes—and
forbade other uses.
Each of these strands or layers of public-lands law has its constituencies.
Extractive industries, their employees, and communities that identify culturally
with them are core supporters of the regimes of privatization, often advocating
significant expansion of extraction, sometimes proposing reopening sale of
public acreage as real estate.86 Topical advocacy groups such as the Sierra Club
and the Wilderness Society played key roles in preserving the lands devoted to
their aesthetic and recreational values, and remain the organized core of a
constituency for wild lands.87 These constituencies are, of course, cross-cutting
and dynamic. Environmentalists, although still sometimes criticized as unduly
fixated on Hudson River School images of American terrain, frequently support
preserving less obviously charismatic landscapes and dimensions of biodiversity,
such as wetlands. Industries that stand to benefit from extractive privatization
may prefer taking resources from public lands to holding the full liability of
private ownership.88
2. The Normative Structure of Public-Lands Law
Public-lands law integrates these competing values through a system of
statutes that are distinguished by their goals and governance regimes. Lands
governed by the Forest Service and BLM under the National Forest Management
Act and FLPMA are, in the parlance of the field, multiple-use acreage, statutorily
dedicated to diverse purposes that are frequently mutually incompatible on any
one tract: “recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and
natural scenic, scientific and historical values.”89 These goals are not exhaustive,

86. See R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER 71–91 (1993) (outlining
sources and orientation of “Sagebrush Rebellion” objections to federal policy); Philip Shabecoff, Watt
Announces Plan to Sell 5% of U.S. Lands, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1982.
87. See Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1145–73 (2010) (tracing
certain of these developments).
88. See, e.g., PHILIP O. FOSS, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN (1960) (classic study of the public-choice dynamics of access to public lands).
89. See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (FLPMA). See also Nat’l Forest Mgmt. Act, Pub. L. No. 94-588 (Oct.
22, 1976) (establishing “multiple use” goals of “in particular . . . outdoor recreation, range, timber,
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and they are not organized by reference to any master-value such as wealthmaximization.90 These pluralist regimes require what is in effect ongoing
landscape-scale zoning, with very substantial agency discretion. A typical
management area in one of these land categories encompasses tens or hundreds
of thousands of acres and is governed by a comprehensive plan, produced by the
Forest Service or BLM in consultation with community members and interest
groups and updated periodically.91 Such a plan might dedicate a valley or forest
to wilderness preservation, hiking, and camping; open other parts of a region to
motorized access and hunting; and provide for timber sales or mineral leases in
selected areas (likely including the areas open to motorized recreation). The
competing uses are not formally mutually exclusive. For example, it is quite
ordinary that an established hiking trail might pass through areas that are grazed
and periodically logged; but mineral extraction tends to exclude much outdoor
recreation, wilderness management precludes motorized activity and extraction,
and wildlife and watershed values are in perennial tension with any other uses
more intensive than wilderness.
The statutory regimes governing lands set aside as national parks (each one
by an act of Congress) neither permit nor oblige so much pluralistic integration.
The National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 directs the agency “to conserve
the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life [sic] therein and
to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as
will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”92 Most acts
creating national parks simply hand them over to the parks regime: Glacier
National Park (1910), for instance, is to be preserved in “a state of nature” with
an eye to “the care and protection of the fish and game,” while Grand Canyon
National Park (1919) is dedicated to “the benefit and enjoyment of the people”
in keeping with the terms of the intervening Organic Act.93 While parks
administration involves complex and contentious issues of ecosystem
management and conflicts between public access and preservation, these
decisions operate within a far narrower range of potential uses than those
governing multiple-use lands, and extractive uses are almost categorically off the
table in parklands. A similarly focused set of purposes governs the National
Wildlife Refuge system, much of it established by presidential withdrawal.
Ecosystem management for habitat health and biodiversity is the touchstone of

watershed, wildlife and fish”); 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012) (setting goals for national forest management of
“outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes”).
90. See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (land planning shall proceed “not necessarily [with reference] to the
combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output”).
91. See, e.g., Bureau of Land Management, Southeastern Oregon Resource Management Plan and
Record of Decision (Sept. 2002), https://www.blm.gov/or/districts/vale/plans/files/seormp/SEORMPRec.of.Decision.pdf (520-page document outlining uses of 4.6 million acres).
92. See An Act to Establish a National Park Service, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (repealed 2014).
93. See id.; Act of May 11, 1910, Pub. L. No. 171, 36 Stat. 354; Act of Feb. 26, 1919, Pub. L. No.
277, 40 Stat. 1175.
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the system, which is chiefly managed by the National Fish and Wildlife Service,
and permission for recreational and hunting access and right-of-ways is
conditional on compatibility with these overriding goals.94
The most categorical of the public-lands statutes, the Wilderness Act
dedicates about 110 million acres to “solitude” and “primitive and unconfined. . .
recreation” by mandating the preservation of its “wilderness character.”95
Wilderness areas are designated by separate acts of Congress and are protected
from motorized access, road construction, and permanent structures.96 While no
single agency administers the federal wilderness system, and wilderness
designations overlie prior designation as national park or national forest, the
Wilderness Act’s categorical requirements impose a uniform management
regime on all lands that it governs.97
One can say, then, that along this spectrum, the hyper-categorical
Wilderness Act all but administers itself (not literally true, of course, but it
imposes relatively little need for administrative agencies to balance interests or
choose among values), while the multiple-use statutes demand pervasive,
ongoing, and very basic judgments of value across the acreage managed by the
Forest Service and BLM. Between the two poles, national parks and wildlife
refuges lean substantially toward the categorical end of the spectrum, permitting
and pragmatically requiring a variety of management decisions, but organizing
these around overriding and all-but-exclusive values of preservation and public
recreation.
C. The Stakes and Structure of Reclassifying Public Lands
Reclassifying acreage among these categories is a high-stakes affair. It
brings constituencies into the decision-making process or excludes them, gives
their goals priority (sometimes absolute priority) or throws them into the scrum
with competing interests. As noted earlier, the weight of these concerns is evident
in Secretary Zinke’s memorandum recommending shrinking Bears Ears and
other monuments, and in President Trump’s remarks upon issuing his monument
proclamations. Both concentrated on the way that establishing a monument
excludes certain extractive and, frequently, recreational interests from the land’s
governance procedures. Secretary Zinke expressly contrasted monument status
with the multiple-use planning process typical of BLM governance, praising the

94.
95.

See 16 U.S.C. § 661.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012); KATIE HOOVER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31447,
WILDERNESS: OVERVIEW AND STATISTICS 1 (2014).
96. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (2012).
97. See 16 U.S.C § 1133(b) (governing use of wilderness areas across agencies); Wilderness Soc’y
v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1056, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasizing the
categorical requirements of the Wilderness Act, which override discretionary agency judgments, even
those arguably consistent with “wilderness values”).
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latter for its inclusiveness and flexibility.98 The effect of the revisions that he
recommended, and which the President adopted, was to return hundreds of
thousands of acres to multiple-use planning. The next three subparts ask how
those revisions fit within the structure of public-lands law, which is defined by
certain patterns in which the powers of reclassification are granted and exercised.
1. Intergenerational Integration
One pattern forms a scheme of intergenerational synthesis that integrates
earlier and later public-lands regimes.99 Across time, public acreage may be
subject to a series of mutually inconsistent statutory regimes. For instance,
virtually all such acreage was at one time eligible for mining claims and
homesteading. National parks and wilderness lands were reserved for purposes
incompatible with such claims, and all public lands were later withdrawn from
homesteading. What is to be done with potentially competing claims arising from
statutory regimes with different goals and administrative mechanisms? In
practice, withdrawal and reservation are limited by previous creation of private
claims. Where privatization statutes have created inholdings and other
conflicting claims, withdrawal and reservation statutes have directed landmanagement agencies to accommodate these or to address them by purchase or
exchange. These principles developed under homesteading-style regimes that
privatized acreage as real estate, and have continued into the modern era of
extractive privatization. Thus parks and wilderness areas have generally been
created subject to previously established private rights, even those new private
claims cannot arise on lands that have been placed under these statutory
regimes.100

98. See Zinke, supra note 28, at 8 (noting the importance of multi-use regimes to economic
development in communities surrounding public lands).
99. Bruce Ackerman develops the idea of intergenerational synthesis among “moments” of
constitutional lawmaking in WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 150–59 (1991) (characterizing, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut as the product of integrating the libertarian commitments of the Bill of Rights
with the New Deal’s empowerment of the social-administrative state), and William Eskridge and John
Ferejohn treat the accumulated normative weight of statutes as “precedent” for the reorientation of fields
of law to new purposes or balances among purposes in A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 224–53 (2010) (on changing models of family and interpersonal commitment). In using
the term “intergenerational synthesis,” I don’t mean to take on any highly specified account of legal
change, authority, or interpretation, but to indicate that my account of public-lands law has affinities with
these ways of achieving coherence across time and among multiple sources of law. While my account is
less theorized, it is also more specific. The structured priorities among the eras, and their expression in
separation of powers with respect to reclassification, make my account more determinate in its interpretive
recommendations than their far-reaching hermeneutics.
100. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (c) (wilderness area created “subject to existing private rights”); 16 U.S.C.
§ 161 (in creation of Glacier National Park, “Nothing . . . shall affect any valid claim, location, or entry
existing under the land laws of the United States . . . or the rights of any . . . claimant . . . to the full use
and enjoyment of his land”).
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2. Separation of Powers
The second pattern structuring public-lands law’s integration of competing
purposes is the presumption against presidential privatization. Although the
President over the twentieth century enjoyed a variety of pre-FLPMA powers to
move multiple-use lands in and out of availability for one purpose or another,
such as mineral leasing, stock-watering, and irrigation, and to sequester land for
national-security purposes, Congress has never authorized the President to
remove land unilaterally from a categorical regime and open it to extraction
under multiple-use management. The reason is not elusive: the categorical
regimes serve preservationist goals, protecting historic, ecological, scenic, and
recreational (wilderness) values that are marked by their vulnerability to
substantially irreversible disruption. It takes only one row of derricks or coppermining pit to spoil a Yosemite Valley, one road to destroy a wilderness area (in
terms of both the cultural meaning of wilderness and the statutory requirements
of the Wilderness Act), one ill-formed or opportunistic digging expedition to
wreck an archaeological site. Opening such a site to extraction runs the risk of
surrendering the option to preserve other values there.
For these reasons, public-lands law has long been structured to avert
precipitate executive privatization, especially of lands set aside categorically for
preservationist purposes. Such privatization, whether in the traditional
homesteading form or, more recently, through timber sales and mineral leases, is
the likeliest way for reclassification to destroy vulnerable values and preclude
later implementation of management regimes aimed at those. Where Congress
has brought lands into a categorical regime, such as under the national parks or
wilderness system, the President has no power to change that status. Even where
the President has enjoyed implicit power to reclassify public lands, such as the
Supreme Court found in Midwest Oil, this power has asymmetrically favored
preservation over privatization.101
FLPMA, passed in 1976, also contains a major example of the conjunction
I am describing: the one-way ratchet of presidential reclassification power,
authorizing movement of lands into categorical and preservation-oriented
regimes, but not out of those regimes into multiple-use classifications. FLPMA
extends the potential for wilderness classification to BLM acreage, which was
omitted from the 1964 Wilderness Act.102 FLPMA directs the Interior
Department to inventory BLM lands with “wilderness characteristics” and the
President to convey to Congress a recommendation as to which of those lands
should be permanently designated as wilderness.103 Once a tract has been
identified by Interior as potential wilderness (whether or not the President
101.
102.

See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing implied presidential power).
See, e.g., Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2012) (creating framework for
establishing wilderness by subsequent legislation and authorizing creation of wilderness areas within
national parks and national forests, but omitting land managed by BLM).
103. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2012).
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recommends permanent designation), FLPMA directs BLM to manage it “so as
not to impair the suitability. . . for preservation as wilderness, subject, however,
to the continuation of existing mining uses and mineral leasing in the manner and
degree in which the same was being conducted [at the time of FLPMA’s
passage].”104 This management directive continues until Congress decides
whether to designate the land permanently as wilderness or to release it into the
general pool of multiple-use BLM lands.105 The Executive has no power to move
the same land back into multiple-use, and so into eligibility for new extractive
and privatizing claims; only Congress can do that.
3. The Antiquities Act in the Public-Lands Setting
The following distinction helps to make sense of the textual differences
between the Antiquities Act, which does not grant the President express power
to revoke or revise monument classifications, and the Forest Service Organic Act
(the Organic Act), which did grant that power for national-forest reservations.
According to the arguments supporting the Trump Administration, this textual
difference is immaterial to the statutes’ actual grant of power: although the
Organic Act otiosely states the obvious, both statutes grant the power to reverse
earlier reclassifications. But there is a difference between the statutes that makes
better sense of the difference in drafting by assuming that the Antiquities Act did
not confer the power of reversal. National forests have always been designated
for multiple-use management, and the decision to move them back into the
default regime of public lands would not essentially change this status. By
contrast, reclassifying categorically protected for into multiple-use management
does essentially change their status.
The Organic Act is the paradigm of a multiple-use statute, one assigning the
management of a class of resources to an expert-staffed government agency
charged with administering it to serve the long-run interest of the public.106 It
was passed in response to worry about exhaustion of economically essential
resources, and presupposed that the executive branch would use a variety of
techniques to balance timbering, long-term forest productivity, and management
of watersheds that were dependent on headwaters forests for erosion and flood
control and yearlong flows.107 The point was to allow private extractive activity
on public lands, under appropriate regulation. Executive discretion,

104.
105.
106.

See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c).
See id.
See 30 Stat. 11, 36 (1897). (“No public forest reservation shall be established except to improve
and protect the forest within the reservation, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of
waterflows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the
United States.”); Purdy, supra note 15, at 189–99 (discussion of conservation statutes).
107. See 21 Cong. Rec. 2537 (1890) (entering into the record a memorial from the American Forestry
Association, urging adoption of interconnected regime for managing forests and watersheds); DEP’T OF
THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 14 (1891) (urging use of the President’s
timber-conservation power to conserve both forests and watersheds).
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appropriately informed by expertise and utilitarian purposes, was the core
governance technique of the statute, replacing a regime of private “entry” onto
timber lands that had produced wasteful, even disastrous over-harvesting.108
The Antiquities Act, by contrast, was a categorical land-classification
statute. Its purpose was to protect certain resources from extraction or other
transformation by removing them categorically from the public lands laws’
schemes of sale and privatization.109 The reason for this approach lay in the
character of the objects that the Antiquities Act protected: they were valuable for
their unique and irreplaceable qualities, rather than for their fungible and
instrumental uses.110 The Antiquities Act of 1906 combined language from two
earlier legislative proposals that had failed between 1900 and 1905. One
comprised bills drafted and promoted by the American Association for the
Advancement of Science and the Smithsonian Institution, respectively, which
sought to preserve Native American relics.111 Such relics had been devastated
by development in the Midwest and were then being actively looted in the
Southwest by settlers, tourists, and freelance scientific expeditions, some of the
largest of which removed the artifacts (and human remains) from the country to
stock European collections.112 The second legislative proposal, which came from
the General Land Office in the Department of the Interior, would have authorized
the President to create national parks to preserve “scenic beauty, natural wonders
or curiosities [and] objects of scientific or historic interest.”113 In extending its
scope to “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures” and “objects of
historic or scientific interest,” the Antiquities Act adopted both strands of the
preservationist program.114
It fits the patterns of public-lands law that the Antiquities Act withheld the
same revocation power that the Organic Act granted because of the distinct
purposes and instruments of the two statutes. For the national forests, presidential
reservation was delegated as a tool in a flexible scheme aimed at increasing the
long-term benefit of a fungible resource by publicly managing the timing and
terms of private extraction. For the national monuments, reservation served to
put unique and irreplaceable objects outside the scheme of extraction and
privatization.
If courts now found that the Antiquities Act authorized the President
unilaterally to reclassify monument lands, they would have identified (or

108. See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 15, at 99 (describing regulatory strategy of this paradigm
conservation statute).
109. See RONALD F. LEE, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, THE ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 1906 13–46 (describing
motivations for passage of Antiquities Act) (1970).
110. See id. (awareness of irreplaceability of artifacts).
111. See id. at 47–77 (detailing drafting history of Antiquities Act and parallel, contemporaneous
proposals).
112. See id. at 29–38, 47–51 (1970).
113. Id. at 52–53.
114. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2012).

948

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 45:921

created) an anomalous power that cuts against the patterned logic of the rest of
the public-lands regime by authorizing the President to unmake national
monuments as he may not national parks or wilderness areas. The silence of the
Antiquities Act on presidential power to revise or revoke monuments is not
simply a standard case of Congress’s having known how to grant a power and
declining, through silence, to do so; it is a case of Congress’s having acted
consistently with a well-justified and consistent pattern of not authorizing
unilateral presidential declassifications of categorically protected lands.
IV. THE ANTI-CORRUPTION GOALS OF PUBLIC-LANDS LAW
The presumption against presidential privatization also roots in worries
about corruption. The concern with corruption had particular weight in eras when
public-lands law was essentially a wealth-disbursement regime that created
private property out of the public domain. Favoritism remains a danger whenever
discretionary power governs the disbursement of valuable public resources.
While courts have scarcely ever directly reviewed executive or legislative action
for “corrupt” motives, and nothing in this argument suggests they should behave
differently in the public-lands setting, statutory design and the separation of
powers can serve as structural anticorruption devices by removing the
instruments of favoritism and self-dealing.
The Antiquities Act’s asymmetric grant of presidential power to confer
protection but not to remove it makes sense if Congress’s withholding the
removal power is in part a structural prophylaxis against corrupt executive
action. While the simplest reason not to give the President removal power is that
he does not need it to accomplish the Act’s purpose of preservation, this is
buttressed by the danger of misusing the power to undercut the Act’s
preservation goal.
Several interlocking considerations support this interpretation. First, in
1906 reformers had agitated for decades against opportunistic privatization of
public land and its resources, focusing on executive-branch officials’ complicity
in privatization that, while often not technically illegal, amounted to wealthgrabs from the public domain.115 Second, the Antiquities Act itself was intended
to prevent opportunistic privatization in the form of expropriation of artifacts or
destruction by development of irreplaceable sites.116 Third, landmark
interpretations of presidential power over the public lands, including the major
twentieth-century Attorney General’s account of the Antiquities Act, have
recognized the following asymmetry: The presidential power to protect land in
order to avert destructive or opportunistic privatization does not imply
presidential discretion to privatize public resources (including making them
available for extraction). Taken together, these considerations support an

115.
116.

See infra discussion in Part IV.A.
See LEE, supra note 112, at 29–38, 47–51.
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interpretation of the Antiquities Act as a structural anti-corruption device,
designed to protect irreplaceable public resources by enabling the President to
prevent their privatization, but not to privatize them himself.
A. The Concern with Corruption in Public-Lands Law
Public-lands corruption was a point of fixation for public debate in much of
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and was particularly salient when
the Antiquities Act was debated and passed. The federal privatization of North
American land, timber, and minerals is one of the great disbursements of wealth
in world history, and it is hardly surprising that it prompted fierce conflict over
the question of who should get the resources and the various forms of
legerdemain that grew up around every privatization scheme. To give a sense of
the scale of the matter: an 1886 House of Representatives report found that
fraudulent claims and illegal fencing of Western grazing lands had brought more
than twenty-one million acres under the control of British and European cattle
capital, including 1.75 million acres in the hands of the memorably titled Marquis
of Tweeddale.117 A reformist commissioner of the General Land Office (GLO)
reported in the mid-1880s that some 40 percent of homesteading claims were
fraudulent but tolerated by the office.118 He reported that; “conspicuously
fraudulent” claims under the Timber Culture Act had been protected by official
rulings of his predecessors and false claims and open looting of public timber
were “universal, flagrant, and limitless.”119 The conflict was not chiefly between
privatizing claimants and federal regulators. It was, rather, a matter of the GLO’s
tolerating or collaborating with large extractive investors’ manipulation of
privatization statutes. So the reformist GLO of the 1880s returned tens of
millions of acres to eligibility for “entry” under statutes governing homesteading
and other small-scale settlement after determining that railroads had locked them
up by abusing the vast grants that were meant to finance their westward
expansion.120 The GLO’s commissioner emphasized that executive-branch
discretion had been the key to a use of the office’s power “to the advantage of

117. See H.R. REP. NO. 2445 at 2 (1886); cf. GATES, supra note 13, at 483 n.58 (suggesting the
report was somewhat sensationalistic but pointed to a real phenomenon; even an exaggerated
documentation highlights the intensity of political sentiment around the issue).
118. See GATES, supra note 13, at 459 (summarizing report of General Land Office Commissioner
William A.J. Sparks).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 460. As Gates notes, the open class-and-faction battles over railroad grants included
incidents such as the following in 1860s Kansas: “raids on the railroad offices, destruction of all the
equipment of surveying parties, public whipping of the officers . . . burning of ties, and the gutting of the
office of a newspaper subsidized by the railroad. Two men who bought land from the railroad were
murdered, a sheriff was arrested and convicted of insanity for aiding the railroad, and defenders of the
railroad were stoned and burned in effigy.”
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speculation and monopoly, private and corporate rather than the public
interest.”121
The same issues remained highly salient during Theodore Roosevelt’s
presidency, when the Antiquities Act became law. President Roosevelt in his
1902 State of the Union address denounced widespread abuse of public-lands
laws and appointed an investigatory commission that found the great majority of
land claims in regions rich in timber or minerals were made by catspaws, then
transferred to speculators or extractive interests.122 President Roosevelt warned
that “ample notice has now been given to the trespassers, and all the resources
that the command of the Government will hereafter be used to put a stop to such
trespassing.”123
Reformers were keenly focused on which legal maneuvers made corruption
possible and what measures might prevent corruption in the disbursement of
public lands.124 In its 1905 report, the Public Lands Commission described
extensive opportunistic privatization.125 Under the Timber and Stone Act,
“many of these [claims] were made by nonresidents . . . who could not use the
land nor the timber upon it . . . and it is apparent that they . . . will eventually
follow the course taken by many similar entries and become part of some large
timber holding.”126 The Commission found that a privatization-for-hire system
had developed: “poor men” filed lands claims, which they transferred to timber
companies, receiving only hourly wages for the time spent on paperwork,
resulting in “the sale of the lands far below their real value.”127 Thus, “timber
lands which should have been preserved for the use of the people are withdrawn
from such use” in favor of corporate profit-taking.128 The Commission found
that the Homestead Act had been “perverted” by a similar claims-for-hire system
in which ostensible settlers (often women or, in the Northern Rockies and Pacific
Northwest, transient Canadians) flipped their claims to speculators.129 Similar
transfers were frequent under the Desert-Land Law.130 In sum, the public-lands
laws had become vehicles for “the shrewd business man who aims to acquire
large properties,” and the majority of privatization served “speculators and
corporations.”131
121. Id. at 472 (quoting General Land Office Commissioner Sparks). Sparks wrote of GLO officers,
“if they do not corruptly connive at fraudulent entries, [they nonetheless do] modify their instructions and
exceed their discretionary powers in examinations of final proof.” DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE, 50 (1885).
122. See GATES, supra note 13, at 487–92; President Theodore Roosevelt, Second Annual Report to
Congress (Dec. 2, 1902).
123. Roosevelt, Annual Report, supra note 122.
124. ELTING E. MORISON, 4 THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 1217–18 (1951).
125. See REPORT OF THE PUBLIC LANDS COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 189 (1905).
126. Id. at vi.
127. Id. at xvi.
128. Id. at xvi–xvii.
129. Id. at xvii–xviii.
130. Id. at xviii–xx.
131. Id. at xxiii.
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Executive-branch corruption was integral to the Commission’s account of
the problem. The Public Lands Commission Report concluded, “Almost without
exception collusion or evasion of the letter and spirit of the land laws was
involved” in the privatization it criticized.132 For example, abuses of the
Homestead Act were frequently facilitated by federal land officials who doubled
as principals in loan companies, who lent the capital to ease each stage of the
claims-and-transfers system that they oversaw, “eager first to induce settlement
and then to make these loans on account of the double commissions received.”133
The commission’s recommendations were chiefly structural changes to publiclands laws to inhibit these opportunistic transactions by restricting hasty transfers
of claimed land and blocking the extension of the Homestead Act to mountainous
regions rich in timber, stone, and minerals, but with little prospect for genuine
160-acre farming settlements in the Midwestern mold.134 It was a time of efforts
to rein in the legal powers that enabled the executive branch to collude in
favoristic or opportunistic disbursements of the wealth of the public lands.
B. Anti-Corruption in Prior Interpretation
1. The Attorney Generals’ Opinions as Anti-Corruption Reasoning
Concern over corruption and opportunistic privatization was ambient
among reformers and provided the major motive for the Antiquities Act. The
same concern emerged as an important feature of the interpretation of the
executive power to reclassify public lands. The concern to check corruption
structurally found expression in a persistent asymmetry, in authoritative
discussions of the President’s public-lands power, between the use of
presidential power to preserve public lands (favored), and uses of presidential
power to tailor or expand privatization and extraction (disfavored).
In 1938, President Franklin Roosevelt asked Attorney General Homer
Cummings to assess a proposal to abolish a small national monument
altogether.135 Cummings concluded that the President lacked the power to do
so.136 Cummings assumed the legality of the earlier presidential reductions in
monument size, describing them as implementing the Act’s requirement that
monuments be “confined to the smallest area compatible” with protecting their
objects.137 In denying that the President may outright declassify a monument, he
contrasted the Antiquities Act with the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897,
which (as noted earlier) “expressly provides that the President at any time may
modify any executive order establishing any forest reserve by reducing its area

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

REPORT OF THE PUBLIC LANDS COMMISSION, supra note 125, at xxiv.
Id. at xviii.
See id. at iv–v.
See Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney National Monument, 39 Op. Atty. Gen.
See id. at 188.
Id.
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or by vacating it altogether.”138 In Cummings’s reasoning, the absence of an
express congressional grant of revocation power in the President implied that
Congress had granted the President only a one-way power of classification: once
the President had classified a site as a monument, “the power conferred by the
act was exhausted.”139
In that last phrase, Cummings quoted his predecessor Edward Bates, who
had written a Civil War-era Attorney General’s opinion finding that President
Lincoln lacked power to make available for privatization a site reserved under
statute by earlier presidential action. In his opinion, Bates argued that
presidential power to reserve federal land should be interpreted as one-way rather
than reversible to prevent corruption.140 Bates’s opinion addressed the question
whether the Secretary of War could release an unused fort to the Treasury
Department for disposal under federal preemption law (a species of nineteenthcentury federal land-privatization that gave priority to the claims of settlers in
actual possession of public land by enabling them to “preempt” other claims),
where the fort had been established by presidential proclamation under
congressional authorization.141 Elaborating on his already-quoted conclusion
that the President’s “power . . . was exhausted” upon reserving the land, and did
not extend to revoking the reservation, Bates argued that discretionary revocation
would invite executive-branch officials to “enrich some speculating favorite”
who could qualify to claim the land as a settler.142 In other words, once lands
had been removed from privatization schemes, the danger of their being
selectively reclassified to favor the patrons or proteges of the executive branch
provided a strong reason not to read Congressional delegation as authorizing
such re-classification.
This concern applied with special force to lands that had been developed at
federal expense, as the fort at Rock Island had been. It would also apply with
special force to land that had been reserved because of its unique and
irreplaceable qualities. Either would be susceptible to ill-motivated discretionary
privatization, and in both cases the loss from such corruption would be
particularly high. There is, then, a snug fit between the basis of the drafting
difference between the Antiquities Act and the Forest Service Act and the
reasoning behind the executive branch’s long-running opinion that national
monument declarations are irrevocable.

138. Id. Attorney General Cummings also distinguished the General Withdrawal Act, which
authorized temporary presidential withdrawals, reversible by executive action. Id.
139. Id. at 187 (quoting Rock Island Military Reservation, 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 359, 364 (1862)).
140. See Rock Island, 10 Op. Atty. Gen. at 363.
141. See id. at 363–67.
142. Id. at 366.
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2. Midwest Oil as an Anti-Corruption Opinion
United States v. Midwest Oil is the Supreme Court’s most important
treatment of presidential power over public lands.143 In the course of affirming
implied executive power to reclassify federal land, it notes the asymmetric
presumption against privatization and ties it to anti-corruption concerns.
In September of 1909, the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey reported
to the Secretary of the Interior that, amid a crowded oil rush, California’s oil
lands would soon be fully privatized under the Oil Placer Act of 1897.144 The
Director expressed concern that the privatization of oil lands would leave the
Navy “obliged to repurchase the very oil” the federal government was then
disbursing.145 On the Secretary’s recommendation, and in anticipation of
Congressional legislation, President Taft then issued a proclamation of
“temporary withdrawal,” removing more than three million acres in California
and Wyoming from eligibility for Placer Act claims.146 Oil operators who filed
claim thereafter on a portion of the affected lands then sued the United States,
asserting that President Taft lacked power to withdraw the lands without explicit
Congressional authorization and in the teeth of an extant statute giving private
parties the right to claim oil lands.147 The Court held that the President had the
power to withdraw the lands from oil claims.148 The power might not inhere in
the office “as an original question,” but a long practice of Congress’s accepting
presidential withdrawal for bird reserves, military reservations, and ancillary
support of the latter (such as hay, water, timber, and target ranges) implied that
the President could withdraw lands “as agent” of Congress and acting “in the
public interest.”149
After marshaling instances of unchallenged presidential withdrawal, Justice
Lamar took pains to emphasize that, “These decisions do not, of course, mean
that private rights could be created by an officer withdrawing for a railroad more
than had been authorized by Congress in the land grant act.”150 The distinction
here is between withdrawing land for purposes of preserving it and, on the other
hand, withdrawing it to create private rights. The latter class of action is
effectively irreversible. It forecloses Congress’s future options in exercising its
ultimate power over public lands. It is also especially susceptible to corruption,
as it offers the President the opportunity to disburse economic assets from the
public lands to favored industries and entities. Both concerns apply to
reclassification of monuments that opens them to mining, drilling, and logging.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
See id. at 466.
Id. at 467.
See id.
See id. 468–69.
See id. at 469.
See Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 475.
Id. at 472–73.
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Both, moreover, distinguish such reclassification from the initial monument
proclamation, which preserves the resources in public hands for any future
contravening (or confirmatory) congressional decision and does not create any
private economic claim on the land.
C. The Anti-Looting Motives of the Antiquities Act’s Adoption
It was in this reformist ferment around the public-lands laws that the
Antiquities Act was adopted. The problem to which the Act responded was an
aspect of a general and long-running crisis that was then regarded as having
entered an acute phase: the looting of the public lands by various forms of corrupt
or opportunistic privatization. The 1904 Senate Committee hearings on a
predecessor bill focused on a legacy that was “being obliterated every day” by
“commercial speculators and excavators.”151 Artifacts were leaving the West in
“carloads” daily during the seasons that permitted excavation.152 Some of the
losses were due to commercial “[v]andals,” and others to archaeological
expeditions launched by European institutions, which had exported “hundreds of
car loads of objects which should have been preserved, as far as possible, in the
condition in which they are found, or which at least have been retained in this
country.”153 With unreserved public lands open to anyone to enter and remove
artifacts as they saw fit, the law effectively invited these forms of commercial
looting and willy-nilly export.
The country’s scientific community mobilized around the looting crisis.
Both the Smithsonian Institution and the Archaeological Institute of America
were closely involved in advocacy and legislative drafting to meet the
emergency, which they aptly expected to intensify as excavators hurried their
efforts in anticipation of regulation.154 There was little comfort in the thought
that artifacts might end up in the hands of museums and collectors, because their
greatest value as public goods was as a source of knowledge about prehistory,
which required their systematic study in their original location.155
The Antiquities Act is part of a family of reforms intended to secure the
public interest in federal lands by raising barriers to opportunistic and corrupt
privatization that undercut that interest. Understanding its origin and purpose
casts light on the way the presidential public-lands power it creates has been
interpreted in the past: as an asymmetric power to preserve public lands and their

151. Preservation of Historic and Prehistoric Ruins, Etc.: Hearing on S. 427 and S. 5603 Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Public Lands, 58th Cong. 5 (1904).
152. See id. at 4–5.
153. Id. at 18.
154. See LEE, supra note 112, at 9, 47.
155. See T. MITCHELL PRUDEN, The Prehistoric Ruins of the San Juan Watershed in Utah, Arizona,
Colorado, and New Mexico, 5 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 225, 237, 288 (1903) (“to gather or exhume
specimens—even though these be destined to grace a World’s Fair or a noted museum—without at the
same time carefully, systematically, and completely studying the ruins from which they are derived . . . is
to risk the permanent loss of much valuable data and to sacrifice science for the sake of plunder”).
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resources from certain kinds of privatization, but not to reclassify those lands so
as to make them newly available for privatization. The asymmetry is a structural
measure to prevent the forms of executive “collusion” with rent-seekers that
privatization statutes had long invited.
D. The Asymmetric Premise Against Presidential Privatization
Anti-corruption concerns, then, form a second and complementary basis of
the asymmetric premise against presidential privatization. Reclassifying
protected lands as eligible for privatizing extraction presents a set of interlocking
dangers. Given the nature of the values typically protected in categorically
preserved land, such as historic and scientific interest and ecological health,
extraction may irremediably compromise those values, effectively denying
Congress the option to preserve them in the future. Given the structure of
intergenerational synthesis in public-lands law, creating private claims also
burdens subsequent Congressional decisions to preserve lands even where it does
not substantively undercut eligibility for preservation (as roads undercut
eligibility for wilderness designation, for instance). Before 1934, when
homesteading effectively ended, privatization of the land itself was the primary
concern of this form. Today, the concern is not that the Executive will literally
sell land out from under Congress, but rather that private rights to mining, oil
leasing, and other extraction, once issued, will burden subsequent management
options.
These reasons for the presumption against privatization find reinforcement
in the threat of corruption: the Executive’s capacity to act quickly and decisively,
the basis of many functionalist assertions of presidential powers, has the
downside risk that a subordinate official—or the President—may
opportunistically disburse private rights in public lands. Both executive
interpretation of Congressional delegations of power (including of the
Antiquities Act itself) and the Court’s interpretation of the President’s implied
power over public lands have taken account of this danger through the structural
anticorruption device of a presumption in favor of a one-way presidential power
of reclassification, toward greater protection, but not toward greater eligibility
for private claims. The same reasons support a conclusion that the President’s
power of proclamation under the Antiquities Act is a power to protect but not a
power to remove protection.
V. MONUMENT REVISIONS AND THE ERAS OF PUBLIC-LANDS POWERS
What, then, to make of the presidential revisions of monument
proclamations in the first fifty years of the Antiquities Act’s operation? These
revisions must be understood in the larger context of shifting congressional and
presidential powers over the public lands. The Antiquities Act has operated
against a changing backdrop of interbranch allocation of power over the public
lands, and this backdrop casts light on the significance of the early presidential
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revisions. The early revisions took place against a background of expansive
claims of presidential power to reclassify federal land. That claimed power helps
to account for the plausibility of the early revisions in their times. It is, however,
no longer part of public-lands law, having been repealed in FLPMA’s sweeping
1976 consolidation of the reclassification power in Congress. Presidents in the
early days of the Antiquities Act had reason to think they could reclassify
monuments in certain cases regardless of whether the Act delegated that power.
That is very different from the question after 1976, when presidential power
depends entirely on the scope of the Act’s delegation.
A. Early Presidential Revisions
Early presidential monument revisions were mostly boundary adjustments,
modest in absolute acreage terms (although they sometimes represented a
substantial percentage of small, site-specific monuments).156 In some cases, the
revisions made corrections to initial proclamations that had relied on hastily
gathered or incomplete information about the character of the protected objects
and the surrounding site.157 In other cases, revisions accommodated pre-existing
private land claims that fell within or were impeded by the monument.158 As
noted in the earlier discussion of intergenerational synthesis, such
accommodation is characteristic of all federal land-reservations schemes; even
the sweepingly antidevelopment Wilderness Act acknowledges existing property
rights.159 Federal land agencies are typically authorized to seek acreage-swaps
with private or state-government landholders to consolidate preserved federal
land without eliminating vested existing rights. Many early revisions simply
carried out these policies to accommodate private rights.160 A handful of
revisions facilitated road-building in the monument or its vicinity, a management
measure consistent with then-current practices in managing national parks and
other lands preserved for scenery and recreation.161 None of these revisions

156. See John Ruple, The Trump Administration and Lessons Not Learned from Prior National
Monument Modifications, 43 HARVARD ENVTL. L. REV. 66–80 (2019) (describing handful of relatively
large revisions).
157. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 873, 36 Stat. 2491 (1909) (Proclamation of President Taft, initially
setting aside Navajo National Monument); Proclamation No. 1186, 37 Stat. 1733 (1912) (revising
boundaries of same); Proclamation No. 2681, 11 Fed. Reg. 2623 (1946) (Proclamation of President
Truman, reducing size of monument by more than 1800 acres of an initial 46,034 because of errors in
initial survey).
158. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 1191, 37 Stat. 1737 (1912) (Taft) and Proclamation No. 1862, 45
Stat. 2984 (1929) (Coolidge) (each modifying Mount Olympus National Monument to exclude a
preexisting homestead); Exec. Order 3897 (Sept. 5, 1923) (excluding land from the Katmai National
Monument to accommodate a prior mining claim).
159. See supra Part III.C.1.
160. See Lee, supra note 112, at 9, 47; see also Ruple, supra note 156 at 55–65 (collecting instances
of monument revisions to accommodate previously existing private rights).
161. See Ruple, supra note 156 at 64–66 (describing revisions to accommodate limited infrastructure
improvements).
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displaced the basic judgments of earlier presidential proclamations as to the
purpose or scale of preservation.
Several more substantial presidential monument revisions pursued national
security interests in wartime—either formally declared or openly anticipated
after major attacks on U.S. assets. In 1915, President Woodrow Wilson removed
313,280 acres from Mount Olympus National Monument, transferring them to
the Olympic National Forest.162 The order came on May 11, four days after a
German submarine sank the British ocean liner Lusitania, killing near 1200
people, including 128 Americans.163 As John Ruple has noted in a survey of
early presidential revisions, the Olympic Peninsula was a key U.S. source of
Douglas fir for ships and Sitka spruce for airplanes, and the U.S. soon dispatched
the “Spruce Production Division” of the Army to the Olympic National Forest to
contribute to timbering and build railroads for shipping trees to sawmills.164 In
March of 1945, President Truman removed 4700 acres from the Santa Rosa
National Monument in Florida to expand an airfield that had become an
important training and testing site for the Army Air Force.165 President
Eisenhower’s 1951 reduction of Glacier Bay National Monument acknowledged
a secret, presidentially authorized airfield that had been built within the
monument during World War Two.166 As I’ll explain in more detail later, these
reductions need not have rested on an Antiquities Act delegation of power to
shrink monuments. They might well be seen as exercising an implied presidential
power to reclassify lands for national-security purposes, which the Supreme
Court recognized in 1915’s United States v. Midwest Oil, and which Congress
explicitly eliminated when it passed FLPMA in 1976.167
The most substantial monument revision to fall outside these interpretations
is President Franklin Roosevelt’s 1940 removal of nearly 72,000 acres, or about
26 percent of the total area, from the second Grand Canyon National Monument,
which President Hoover had proclaimed in 1932.168 Roosevelt had earlier vetoed
a bill to shrink the monument along lines different from the ones he proclaimed,
and there was widespread perception that the monument should be adjusted to
exclude certain private inholdings;169 but Roosevelt’s action unmistakably
assumed presidential power to shrink a monument upon reconsideration of the
fit between its purposes and its boundaries, and on a considerably larger scale
than in earlier and smaller adjustments to accommodate private property.
162. See Proclamation No. 1293, 39 Stat. 1726 (1915); CAROL HARDY VINCENT & LAURA A.
HANSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44988, EXECUTIVE ORDER FOR REVIEW OF NATIONAL
MONUMENTS: BACKGROUND AND DATA 8 (2017).
163. See Ruple, supra note 156 at 79 (detailing timing of various monument revisions in relation to
acts of war).
164. See id. at 82.
165. See Proclamation No. 2659, 10 Fed. Reg. 10275 (Aug. 22, 1945).
166. Proclamation No. 3089, 20 Fed. Reg. 2103 (1951).
167. See Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 459.
168. Proclamation No. 2393, 54 Stat. 2692 (1940); Proclamation No. 2022, 47 Stat. 2547 (1932).
169. See Ruple, supra note 156 at 66–71 (recounting political sequence of Grand Canyon revision).
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Although Roosevelt’s proclamation by itself does not constitute a pattern
interpretation of the Antiquities Act, it stands as an important precedent of
presidential monument revision without repudiation by Congress. The larger
setting of presidential powers in which it happened, however, suggests that its
significance may be less than has been claimed for it.
B. The Zenith of Presidential Withdrawal and Reservation Power
The Antiquities Act was adopted in a period of aggressive but contested
presidential withdrawal and reservation. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1903
began a practice of unilaterally declaring “bird reservations” that set aside
habitat. The fifty-one reservations that he had created by the end of his second
term in 1909 formed the basis of the National Wildlife Refuge System, which
now encompasses more than 150 million acres of land and water.170 These
unauthorized presidential reservations overrode congressional privatization
statutes that created private rights of entry and acquisition on public lands.171
Although congressional acquiescence to these reservations formed an important
part of the basis of the Supreme Court’s finding of an implied presidential
reservation power in Midwest Oil, no statute formally delegated the power to
create them.172 The custom for decades was that proclamations of wildlife
refuges either declared a new refuge without reference to any basis of the power
or simply invoked “the authority vested in me as President of the United
States.”173 As we shall soon see, much turned on the scope of the latter power,
which the Franklin Roosevelt Administration in particular asserted as the basis
of its public-lands decisions.
Despite its boldness in creating wildlife refuges, Theodore Roosevelt’s
Administration did not move to create national monuments without explicit
congressional authorization. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but almost
certainly included the general impression, evident in the legislative history and
subsequent administration of the Antiquities Act, that monuments resembled
national parks, which had always been congressional creations.174 They likely

170. See JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW & POLICY 149 (3d. ed. 2016)
(recounting these facts).
171. See Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 469 (referring to the many cases in which “the Executive, by a
special order, has withdrawn lands which Congress, by general statute, had thrown open to acquisition by
citizens”). It was for this reason that three justices dissented from the Court’s opinion, led by Justice Day.
172. See CHARLES F. WHEATLEY, JR., FOR THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, STUDY
OF WITHDRAWALS AND RESERVATIONS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN LANDS 244–45 (1969).
173. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 4851 (establishing Upper Klamath Wildlife Refuge) (Pres. Coolidge,
Apr. 3, 1928) (“it is hereby ordered that the unappropriated public lands . . . are hereby reserved and set
apart . . . as a refuge and breeding ground for birds and wild animals.”); Exec. Order No. 6924 (establishing
Lake Mattamuskeet Wildlife Refuge) (Pres. Roosevelt, 1934) (reserving lands “by virtue of and pursuant
to the authority vested in me as President”).
174. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GENERAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE NATIONAL
MONUMENTS 5–6 (“National Monuments differ from national parks in several respects, particularly with
regard to method of creation, but it would be difficult to define one generally in terms that would exclude

2018]

WHOSE LANDS? WHICH PUBLIC?

959

also included awareness of congressional skepticism of sweeping presidential
reservations, even in multiple-use categories such as national forests, which did
not limit privatization as sharply as monuments declarations did. Although the
President in 1906 had enjoyed unilateral power to create national forests for most
of two decades under congressional acts of 1891 and 1897, Congress forbade
future unilateral national forest designations in 1907.175
Congress passed the General Withdrawals Act (Pickett Act) of 1910 with
the ostensible aim of clarifying the scope of presidential power in this area;
however, the effect proved to be quite the opposite. Congress acted at the behest
of President Taft, who sought clarification on the extent of presidential power
following his controversial 1909 withdrawal of oil-producing lands from
mineral-leasing programs.176 The resulting legislation authorized the President
“temporarily [to] withdraw from settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the
public lands” and to “reserve the same for . . . public purposes to be specified in
the orders of withdrawal.”177
Had the Pickett Act simply affirmed a power of temporary withdrawal
parallel to whatever other powers the President held over public lands? Or
instead represented an exhaustive account of the President’s power in the field,
precluding subsequent withdrawal or reservation except on its express
authorization or that of another statute? The question came to a head in a clash
of legal and bureaucratic giants in Franklin Roosevelt’s Administration. The
Pickett Act required that lands withdrawn under its authority remain open to
hard-rock mining, and President Roosevelt sought to withdraw public lands in
Oregon from the operation of the mining laws as well as other extraction
regimes.178 Attorney General Robert Jackson, asked by the President to assess
the legality of the proposed action, initially concluded that the Pickett Act was
intended to occupy the field and thus precluded any further implied or inherent
power—which would have to provide the basis of the proposed mining
withdrawal, as such withdrawal had no statutory foundation.179 Besides citing
legislative history suggesting that the Pickett Act was intended to “clearly define
the extent of [withdrawal] authority,” Jackson argued, “If . . . the President [had]
an unrestricted, inherent power to withdraw lands from the public domain for
public purposes, he could avoid, in every instance, the restrictions upon his
statutory power by simply ignoring the withdrawal statute and acting upon his

the other. It has been the endeavor of the Interior Department to administer those monuments under its
control along the lines of national-park protection and development . . .”) (1917).
175. See RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 146 (2d. ed. 2006).
176. See Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., Withdrawals under the Federal Land Policy Management Act of
1976, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 311, 316–18 (1979) (summarizing this debate and its aftermath).
177. Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1976).
178. Letter of Attorney General Robert Jackson to the Secretary of the Interior, July 25, 1940.
179. Id.
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non-statutory, inherent power.”180 Such a power, Jackson contended, would
make the withdrawal and reservations statutes of public-lands law merely
advisory, a strange result for a field of law founded on the Property Clause’s
grant of power over public lands to Congress.181
From the Department of the Interior, Secretary Harold Ickes shot back, “The
President in the exercise of his presumed inherent general withdrawal power has
issued approximately 268 executive orders of withdrawal since 1910 . . . . It is
imperative that lands set apart for national defense and other purposes should be
subject to the exclusive use and jurisdiction of the Federal Government.”182
Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, chimed in, warning of “inconvenience and
embarrassment” if lands withdrawn for military purposes were subject to private
mining claims, and Thomas Emerson, a legal anchor of the New Deal who would
go on to argue Griswold v. Connecticut and teach for three decades at Yale Law
School, wrote a special memorandum from within the Attorney General’s office,
arguing against Jackson’s conclusion.183 At first Jackson stood his ground,
reiterating his earlier arguments in reply to Ickes.184 On June 4, 1941, under
intense pressure, he reversed his position and submitted an official opinion
agreeing with Ickes and Emerson that the Pickett Act left undisturbed a distinct
presidential power to reserve public lands permanently.185 It is not clear whether
Jackson changed his mind or only his position: he submitted his own earlier letter
alongside his final opinion, noting in a cover memorandum that “the question is
important and may be said to be close.”186 In the final opinion, Jackson recited,
then repudiated, his former view that the President’s asserted general power of
permanent withdrawal would leave no purpose for lesser statutory delegations of
withdrawal power; but he did not refute it, instead nakedly asserting that the
President could choose to exercise a lesser, statutory power if he saw fit.187 At
other points, the final opinion simply adopts portions of Thomas Emerson’s
earlier text.188 Eight days after the opinion, on June 12, 1941, President

180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 4 (emphasis original).
Id.
Letter of Interior Secretary Harold Ickes to the Attorney General, Feb. 13, 1941, at 4–5.
Letter of Henry Stimson, Dec. 21, 1940; Memorandum of Thomas Emerson to Charles Fahy,
Asst. Solicitor General, May 9, 1941 (arguing that the Pickett Act, in referring only to “temporary”
withdrawals, left undiminished an executive power to make permanent withdrawals from and reservations
of the federal public lands). See also Glenn Fowler, Thomas I. Emerson, 83, Scholar Who Molded Civil
Liberties Law, N.Y. TIMES, (June 22, 1991) (obituary of Thomas Emerson),
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/22/obituaries/thomas-i-emerson-83-scholar-who-molded-civilliberties-law.html.
184. Letter of Attorney General Robert Jackson, Apr. 11, 1941.
185. See 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 73, 75 (1941).
186. Memorandum of Attorney General Robert Jackson, June 4, 1941.
187. See 40 Op. Atty. Gen. at 81.
188. See id. at 83 (adopting portions of Emerson’s memorandum of May 9, 1941 concern the
“practical results” of constraint on the executive branch that might follow from a contrary opinion).
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Roosevelt nominated Jackson to the Supreme Court, and he took the oath of
office on July 11, less than a month after his nomination.189
Six months and a week after Jackson reversed his opinion and adopted the
Ickes-Emerson line, the country was at war, and any concern with the niceties of
presidential control over public lands was eclipsed. From then until the adoption
of FLPMA in 1976, the official view of the executive branch was that the
President (and by delegation the Secretary of the Interior) could withdraw or
reserve lands permanently for public purposes.190 Indeed, it seems to have been
the position of most of the executive branch, emphatically including Ickes’s
Interior Department, well before Jackson came around to it. As Charles Wheatley
judges in his comprehensive assessment of the withdrawal power before
FLPMA, “At least from 1934, it appears to be the practice of the Executive in
making . . . withdrawals which are not specifically requested by statute, but are
made in his discretion, to cite both the Pickett Act and the President’s general
inherent authority as the legal basis for the withdrawal.”191 Wheatley noted that
the Pickett Act was itself generally treated as authorizing indefinite withdrawals,
“temporary” only in the sense that they were subject to later revocation by
Congress or the President, so the “inherent” authority was coextensive with it
except where withdrawals extended to mining, in which case the inherent power
was taken to kick in.192 This “inherent” power was little theorized in its later
uses, other than invocations of Midwest Oil and executive practice. In the
disputes leading up to Midwest Oil, it was generally formulated as a
“stewardship” power in the President to protect the public lands on behalf of
Congress, which had undisputed ultimate authority over them under the Property
Clause.193
This historical exposition sheds light on the substantial monument
reductions of the first fifty years of the Antiquities Act. Never tested in court,
they took place in a legal landscape in which specific statutory authorizations of

189. I am aware of no evidence that Jackson’s nomination was conditioned on his concession of the
withdrawal power issue. As I indicate in the body text, however, it does seem to me that Jackson regarded
himself as more nearly outvoted than out-argued. Ickes clearly wanted this general withdrawal power, and
outflanked Jackson bureaucratically to ensure that it became executive-branch policy in a time when
Roosevelt enjoyed substantial congressional majorities and a rising concern with war soon eclipsed the
finer points of public-lands powers.
190. See Exec. Order No. 10,355, 17 Fed. Reg. 4831 (1952) (order of President Truman delegating
to the Interior Secretary (“the authority vested in the President by [the Pickett Act] and the authority
otherwise vested in him to withdraw or reserve lands . . . for public purposes, including the authority to
modify or revoke withdrawals and reservations of such lands heretofore or hereafter made”).
191. Wheatley, Study of Withdrawals, supra note 172, at 126.
192. See id. at 128–29.
193. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ANN. REP. 12 (1908) (“If there be no power to affirmatively
provide for the ultimate use or disposition of the public domain in accordance with the needs to the public
welfare, it is the duty of the Executive to temporarily prevent its acquisition until Congress may have an
opportunity to consider the question and adopt appropriate legislation. . . . [Such withdrawals over the
country’s history] were purely the acts of stewards farsighted enough to foresee and protect the interests
of their principal, the people of the United States.”).
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withdrawal and reservation coexisted with a widely accepted presidential power
to accomplish the same reclassifications on other, imprecisely specified grounds.
There was little clear difference, if any, between what the President might do
under the Antiquities Act and what he might do through the latter implied power;
as we have seen, Attorney General Jackson thought there was none, and that this
was evidence of trouble with the Administration’s theory of presidential powers.
Roosevelt’s capacity to put the stamp of legality on his Grand Canyon reduction
was overdetermined by a legal landscape in which the President successfully
asserted a robust set of powers for reclassifying public lands.
Nonetheless, even the most aggressive account of presidential discretion in
public-lands reclassification featured the asymmetric preference for preservative
decisions: the whole purpose of the President’s power was to hold open
Congress’s options for ultimate disposition of the land. This is consistent with
the Court’s analysis in Midwest Oil and, indeed, very nearly a consequence of
the Property Clause’s assignment of public-lands power to Congress: the
President’s power must be in service of Congress’s, either by delegation or by
implied power of preservation. This asymmetry is consistent, too, with the
preference for keeping resources in categorical preservation status once they are
assigned to it that I described in Part III.C, above. In these respects, public-lands
law is consistent across its eras.
C. Early Presidential Revisions in the Arc of Public-Lands Law
The executive-branch precedents for substantial monument revision, then,
date back to a time of far more expansive presidential authority over the public
lands. The powers asserted in that period were in some tension with the
coherence of public-lands law overall. Soon-to-be Justice Jackson made a good
case that they were incompatible with it, which was never really answered even
though he abandoned it as a lost cause in bureaucratic infighting. Whatever their
theoretical excesses, however, these powers were generally rationalized as
executive stewardship of Congress’s final authority over public-lands
classification, and were mostly asserted in exercises consistent with the premise
against presidential privatization. They account for the early, substantial
presidential revisions of national monuments in ways that make Antiquities Act
authority unnecessary in accounting for those exercises of presidential power.
These powers are also consistent in the substance of their exercise, if not always
in the Roosevelt Administration’s maximalist and inexact articulation, with the
general structure of public-lands law.
VI. CONCLUSION
In its monuments proclamations, the Trump Administration asserts a
sweeping power to reclassify fifteen million acres of protected federal land and
hundreds of millions of marine acres. The burden of my argument has been that
legal analysis of the monuments proclamations can take account of how the
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proclamations fit within the larger and theoretically neglected terrain of publiclands law. Corruption is not a novel concern here. For well over a century, the
field has been shaped by recognition that precipitate and opportunistic
privatization is a perennial temptation in a body of law that governs nearly a third
of the country’s acreage and a great deal of its natural wealth. The executive
branch’s capacity for rapid, unilateral, and obscure action makes it especially
suited to this form of misappropriation. Recognition of these facts is built into
public-lands law in the long-standing asymmetric preference for presidential
power to preserve lands over presidential power to privatize them. That
preference finds expression in statutory structure (e.g., the Pickett Act, FLPMA),
jurisprudence (e.g., United States v. Midwest Oil), and executive-branch analysis
(e.g., the opinions of Attorneys General Cummings and Bates). It also informs
the larger pattern of powers in public-lands law. Understanding that pattern helps
to show why the Antiquities Act would be anomalous if it were read today as
authorizing substantial and unilateral presidential declassification of monuments.
A Court would properly consider the anomaly in deciding whether the power to
create national monuments should imply the power to unmake them.
Public-lands law has been shaped by grappling with the themes that the
Trump proclamations raise, and its shape contains a good part of an answer.
Public-lands populists’ claims on behalf of privatizing and extractive policies
already have a specific legal expression that is deeply embedded in public-lands
law: in long-standing public rights-of-way across the federal lands of the West,
in mining and mineral-leasing regimes, in grazing rights, and in the default policy
of extensive public recreational access—and, above all, in the private real estate
that was substantially created under federal privatization schemes. Where they
have been vested, they tend to persist within new regimes that otherwise
emphasize preservation over extraction and economic use. On multiple-use
lands, they play a prominent part in the statutorily mandated planning process.
Where, however, they are not vested but take the form of inchoate expectations
of continued access, they yield on categorically protected lands: new privatizing
and extractive claims are almost uniformly excluded under preservation regimes.
For such claims to get traction again, the lands themselves must be reclassified.
That reclassification is generally reserved to Congress. If the Antiquities Act
authorizes the President to hand a victory to public-lands populists by
reclassifying hotly contested lands, then it is a dramatic anomaly in public-lands
law. It would authorize perennial and shifting reopening of precisely the disputes
that the field exists to structure and resolve, and through a mechanism that is
procedurally orthogonal to the rest of the field.
The Trump proclamations raise a novel question concerning one of the most
important public-lands statutes. Principles that are well-grounded in the structure
of public-lands law give good reason to judge that the President’s proclamations
are not authorized by the Antiquities Act. Understanding why this is so also sheds
important light on this field of law.
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